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In 2014, the Reproductive Health Care Bill was introduced in Parliament. The 
Bill affords a chapter for the regulation of altruistic gestational surrogacy 
arrangements, a non-commercial agreement between two parties, in which 
one party agrees to bear a child of which the party is not genetically related to 
and upon the birth of the child relinquish all parental rights over the child to 
the other party. The determination of legal parentage of the child born from 
such an arrangement has been a legal tussle for courts in Kenya to contend 
with since neither the current laws nor the proposed Reproductive Health Care 
Bill provide direction as to whom parental rights are entitled upon the birth of 
the baby.  
The objective of this research paper is to determine which party is entitled to 
these parental rights. On the one hand, these rights may be entitled to the 
surrogate since she carried and gave birth to the child while the rights may 
also be entitled to the intending parents who contracted the surrogate and 
initiated the whole process. Either way, the lack of legal direction on the issue 
has led to uncertainty and controversies. 
Therefore, this paper conducted a qualitative study which comprised of a 
literature review of the determination of legal parentage in gestational 
surrogacy arrangements. First, this paper explored the theoretic framework 
underpinning altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements. Second it 
addressed the state’s and the societal interest in the determination of legal 
parentage in these arrangements and third, it undertook a comparative review 
of the legal framework in the United Kingdom and South Africa which offer 
guidance for the determination of legal parentage in an altruistic gestational 
surrogacy agreement in Kenya. Consequently, this paper finds the law of 
contract is sufficient to ensure the validity of the terms of an altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangement. Thus, the intending parents should have 
primary parental rights upon the birth of the child. Furthermore, this paper 
also asserts that the inevitable role played by the state in implementing a legal 
framework that recognises the intending parents as the legal parents of  the 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 Background 
Article 45(1) of the Constitution safeguards the right to family as a 
fundamental human right to which each person is entitled.1 Similarly, the 
Universal Declaration for Human Rights reiterates that the family is the most 
basic unit of society. It ought to be protected not only by the state but also the 
society.2 In Skinner v. Oklahoma,3 the right to procreate was identified as “one 
of the basic civil rights of man.” It is in light of this basic right that many 
childless couples today have resorted to alternative means of having a family. 
However, the proliferation of new reproductive technologies, including 
altruistic gestational surrogacy, continues to raise intricate legal and ethical 
issues.4 A key fundamental issue being the status of the surrogate mother, does 
she relinquish all her parental rights by entering into a surrogate agreement?5 
To begin with, there are two forms of surrogacy, traditional and gestational 
surrogacy.6 The former refers to an arrangement where a couple contracts with 
a surrogate mother to have the male sperm artificially inseminated into the 
surrogate. The surrogate uses her own egg and is therefore genetically related 
to the child while the latter, is a contractual undertaking whereby the surrogate 
mother, agrees to conceive a child through artificial insemination with the 
sperm of the natural father, or insemination of the fertilized gametes of the 
commissioning couple. 7 It may be commercial where the surrogate is paid to 
gestate, bear and relinquish all parental rights to the child after birth or it may 
                                                        
1 Article 45(1), Constitution of Kenya (2010). 
2 Article 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10th December 1948. 
3 Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, ex. rel. Williamson 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
4 Epstein A, ‘Surrogacy: the case for full contractual enforcement’ 81 Virginia Law Review 
(1995), 2305-2341, surrogacy contracts are coupled with matters of commodification, 
incommensurability, inequality of bargaining power, the privity rule and gender inequality. 
5 Anita L, ‘Privacy, surrogacy, and the Baby M case’ 808 Pennsylvania Legal Scholarship 
Repository (1987), 1759. 
6 Garrity A, ‘Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and Great Britain-
A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana,’ 60 Louisiana Law Review (1999) 809. 
7 Garrity A, ‘Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and Great Britain-
A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana,’ 809-810. 
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be non-commercial, also referred to as altruistic.8 This paper’s main focus is 
the latter. 
Historically, one of the earliest forms of surrogacy traces back to the Old 
Testament of the Holy Bible where Sarai, the wife of Abraham was unable to 
bear a child. She suggested to him to use her maid Hagar and get a child.9 This 
served as an example of the traditional form of surrogacy where the surrogate, 
in this case, Hagar, was genetically linked to the child.10  
On the other hand, the first ever report of a baby being born under gestational 
surrogacy was from the United States in 1985,11 but it was the highly 
paternalistic response in Baby M’s Case12 where the New Jersey Supreme 
Court declared all surrogacy agreements to be void and unenforceable that 
made headlines.13 In contrast, a liberal response was given in Johnson v 
Calvert14 where a Californian Supreme Court held that surrogacy 
arrangements involved free, informed and rational choice by a woman to use 
                                                        
8Drabiak K, Wegner C, Fredland V and Helft, P.R., ‘Ethics, law, and commercial surrogacy: 
A call for uniformity’ 35 The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics (2007), 301 defines 
commercial surrogacy as a contractual relationship where compensation is paid to a surrogate 
and agency, excluding any reasonable medical, legal, or psychological expenses, in exchange 
for the surrogate’s gestational services.  
9 Genesis 16:1-2, Holy Bible King James Version, Abraham did as he was told and at the age 
of 90yrs, Ishmael was born. 
10 Hatzis A, ‘Just the oven: a law & economics approach to gestational surrogacy contracts’ 
Perspective for the Unification or Harmonisation of Family Law in Europe, Intersentia, 
Antwerp (2003), 414. 
11 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 84, a surrogacy agency in the United 
States made a commercial surrogacy arrangement with Mrs. Cotton (the surrogate) for a 
couple (intentional parents) in the U.S. The local British authority intervened and made Baby 
Cotton a ward of court. The judge determined that the couple would be suitable parents and 
used the best interest of the child.  
12 Re Baby M 109 N.J. 396,537 A.2d 1227, 1988 N.J.77 A.L.R.4th 1, where a couple, Mr. and 
Mrs. Stern, entered into a surrogacy agreement with the surrogate mother, Mary Whitehead, 
whereby she had to carry the child to term and surrender custody of the child in return for 
$10,000 plus medical expenses. After the birth, Ms. Whitehead rescinded the contract and 
refused to deliver the child due to deep-seated attachment with the child. 
13 In Re Baby M, the Court refused to extend the protection of ‘right to privacy’ and ‘right to 
procreation’ to such agreements holding that “the custody, care, companionship, and 
nurturing that follow birth are not parts of the right to procreation.” 
14 Johnson v Calvert Cal. Sup. Ct., 5 Cal4th 84, 851 P.2d 776 (1993,.the argument that a 
woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate and deliver a baby for intending 
parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for centuries prevented women from attaining 
equal economic rights and professional status under the law. To resurrect this view is both to 
foreclose a personal and economic choice on the part of the surrogate mother, and to deny 




her body, underpinning the ‘freedom to contract’ and economic independence 
of the women.15 
In the Kenyan Context, African Customary Law provides for woman to 
woman marriages where a barren woman marries another woman to have 
children for her.16 This marriage can take place whether the husband of the 
barren woman is alive or dead.17 
Presently, altruistic gestational surrogacy has become a legal issue for the 
courts when they are faced with the question of determining to whom the 
parental rights should be accorded. In AMN & 2others v Attorney General and 
5others,18 the court in determining the registration of a child born out of 
surrogacy acknowledged the absence of a law on surrogacy in Kenya, and 
held that the surrogate was the legal mother until an adoption order changed 
this status.19 Similarly, in Re the Matter of Baby TDL,20 the court held that the 
commissioning parents had to seek an adoption order to be indicated as the 
legal parents of the child. Likewise, in JLN & 2others v Director of Children 
Services & 4 others,21 the court took the stand that in the absence of a 
                                                        
15 Johnson v Calvert. 
16 Article 2(4), Constitution of Kenya, see also section 3(2), Judicature Act (Act No 16 of 
1967).  
17Alsaker K, ‘When African women take wives: A Historical Overview’ 6 The Nordic Africa 
Institute (1997) 5-6.  
18 A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General & 5 others [2015] eKLR where the petitioners X and 
Y entered into a surrogacy agreement, but thereafter were denied passports for the children 
even though they had received a birth certificate indicating them as parents of the children. 
The UK home office rejected their application holding that surrogacy was not recognised in 
Kenya and that they should seek adoption under the Hague Convention or register the children 
as British Citizens To seek British citizenship for J and G; two options are available, adoption 
under Article 23 of the 1993 Hague Convention on the Protection of children and Co-
operation in Respect of the Inter-Country Adoption – certificates issued under The Hague 
Convention Article 23 are acceptable for passport services or registration as a British citizen 
– it is open to you to contract the United Kingdom Visa & Immigration service (UKV&I) 
with a view to registering the children as British citizens.   
19 A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General & 5 others, in the absence of a legislative framework 
in Kenya, the position taken by the UK Courts and noting specifically the issues before me, 
ought to prevail here and so I will find that the surrogate mother is the mother of the twins 
until such a time as the necessary legal processes are undertaken or until this or any other 
Court has issued requisite orders in that regard. 
20 Re the Matter of Baby T D L [2014] eKLR. 
21 J L N & 2 others v Director of Children Services & 4 others [2014] eKLR, even in the 
absence of a legal regime, the court or any persons dealing with the issues must, in accordance 
with Article 57 of the Constitution, decide the issue on the basis of the best interests of the 
child. A child born out of a surrogacy arrangement is no different from any other child. Under 
Article 53 of the Constitution and section 11 of the Children Act every child has the right to 
certainty of their parentage, a right to family, a right to a name acquired through issuance of 
a birth certificate, a right to access health services and a right not to suffer discrimination of 
any form arising from their surrogate birth. These rights are buttressed by international 
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regulatory framework on surrogacy, the child would be treated as any other 
child and therefore the surrogate mother was the legal mother. In the same 
case, Justice Majanja posited that, 
‘Surrogacy is not a hypothetical issue any more. It is real and many Kenyans 
are resulting to surrogacy as an alternative to being parents. It is the duty of 
the State to protect the children born out of such arrangements by providing a 
legal framework to govern such arrangements.’22  
It is in light of this that the Reproductive Health Care Bill was introduced in 
Parliament in 2014.23 The Bill recognises altruistic gestational surrogacy in 
Kenya and provides a regulatory framework on the same.24 However, the bill 
does not address the question of legal parentage and to whom parental rights 
are entitled upon the birth of the baby.25 Legal parentage is an issue that has 
dogged courts around the world for many years. Different approaches have 
been taken for example in England, in Re X (A child),26 the court held that the 
surrogate is the child’s legal mother while in other jurisdictions like France 
and Italy, the surrogate mother has no parental rights over the child.27 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
The Constitution of Kenya recognizes the right to family.28 The Reproductive 
Health Bill provides a way of safeguarding this right by providing for 
gestational surrogate arrangements. However, the law in Kenya still remains 
silent on whether parental rights are awarded to the surrogate or the 
commissioning parents upon birth of the baby. Therefore, in the event of a 
tussle, there is no specific direction under existing law.  
                                                        
instruments like the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child under Articles 7 and 9 respectively. 
22 J L N & 2 others v Director of Children Services & 4 others [2014] eKLR. 
23 The Reproductive Health Care Bill (Senate Bill No. 17 of 2014). 
24 Part III, Reproductive Health Care Bill. 
25The Reproductive Health Care Bill deals with issues of reproductive health like 
contraceptives, abortion et al and affords a chapter to altruistic gestational surrogate 
motherhood arrangements.   
26 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam). 
27 Re X (A child) [2014]. 
28 Article 45(1), Constitution of Kenya. 
5 
 
1.2 Justification of the Study  
The right to family is an instrumental entitlement that each person should be 
afforded. Likewise, the rights of the child are of paramount importance in 
every society so including a child’s legal identity.29 In the absence of laws in 
Kenya giving direction on the issue of legal parentage, this research will 
critically evaluate the legal issue at hand and propose a way forward. This 
research will serve as an indispensable contribution to the proposed legal 
regulatory framework on gestational surrogacy in Kenya.  
1.3 Statement of Objective(s)  
1. The specific objective of this paper is to determine to whom parental 
rights are entitled to in altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements upon the 
birth of the baby.  
2. The general objective of this paper is to evaluate the legal and ethical 
enforcement of altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements in Kenya. 
1.4 Research Question(s)  
1. To whom should legal parental rights be granted in an altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangement be accorded; the surrogate mother or the 
commissioning woman?   
2. Does Kenyan Law contemplate the legal enforcement of altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangements? 
1.5 Literature Review  
Although a myriad of authorities have discussed the unique nature of altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangements, there is still a scarcity on the issue of 
legal parentage especially in Kenya.30  
Firstly, Amy Garrity while examining the legal framework on gestational 
surrogacy in the United Kingdom and the United States, notes that a twofold 
                                                        
29 Article 53(1), Constitution of Kenya. 
30 A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General & 5 others [2015] eKLR, Justice Isaac Lenaola, letter 
by the AG, Kenyan law is silent on the issue of surrogacy. Consequently, this is an area for 
future development of public policy and law.  
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response has been adopted by legislatures across the world. Some have 
banned all surrogacy contracts31 while other legislatures have made these 
agreements legal but under regulation in which they have tried to address the 
issue legal parentage, for example, California.32  
Edgar Page, asserts that there is no point at which the genetic parents 
voluntarily surrender or transfer their parental rights to child. They simply 
transfer their gametes to the womb of the surrogate to gestate the child. The 
arrangement is made with the surrogate on the reliance that after birth the 
child is theirs.33 
On the other hand, Margaret Brinig holds that contract law should not be 
applied in surrogacy cases because it is the courts that should make decisions 
concerning a child’s custody and prospective parents in a surrogate 
agreement.34 Similarly, Erin Hisano points out that legal parentage is an 
adjudicative matter for the courts to determine using three key tests:35 The 
Genetic Maternity Rule espouses that a woman’s genetic contribution to the 
child is the determining factor for legal parentage. Secondly, the Gestational 
Maternity Rule proposes that the birth mother is entitled to legal parental 
rights. This is based on the emotional and physical connection developed 
                                                        
31 Lascarides D, ‘A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts’ 25 Hofstra 
Law Review (1997) 1231, in states like Arizona, Louisiana, Michigan, Indiana surrogacy 
contracts are void and unenforceable. 
32 Garrity A, ‘Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and Great Britain-
A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana,’ 815, California is one of the states that has taken a 
pro surrogacy approach in the United States with about 35-40 surrogate agencies and about 
1000 surrogate births in a year. The courts have created a strong line of jurisprudence with 
the California Supreme Court holding that the gestational surrogate has no parental rights to 
the child. See also Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Armstrong 704 S.W.2d 209 
(Ky. 1986), the court held that a corporation's involvement in a surrogate parenting procedure 
did not contravene statutory prohibition against purchasing a child for the purposes of 
adoption, where the agreement to bear the child was entered into before conception.  
33 Page E, ‘Donation, Surrogacy and Adoption’ 2 Journal of Applied Philosophy (1985), 163-
164 where a donation is defined as “a gift and if you give something away, any rights and 
duties you have in respect of that thing are transferred to the person to whom it has been 
given.  There is a clear agreement between the commissioning couple and the surrogate that 
the child will be returned to them when it is born. The case has yet to be made for saying that 
the claims of the gestator override the claims of the commissioning parents who in this case 
wish to retain rather than surrender their rights and duties in respect of the embryo and 
resulting child. We cannot simply assume this. And to make an ad hoc ruling would seem to 
do an injustice to the commissioning couple.” 
34 Brinig M.F, ‘A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's 
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement’ 81 Virginia Law Review (1995), 
2386. 
35 Hisano E.Y, ‘Gestational Surrogacy Maternity Disputes: Refocusing on the Child’ 15 
Lewis & Clark Law Review (2011), 539-543. 
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during pregnancy. Consequently, the Intended Maternity Rule considers the 
element of intention between the surrogate and the arranging party. If the 
parties contracted for the purpose of gestating a child and on birth belongs to 
the commission parents, this serves as the determining factor. However, there 
is no set criteria on which test ranks above the other. Subsequently, it would 
be unjust for courts to rank either one above the others.36  
Likewise, Imra Russel posits that the issue of parental status in surrogacy 
agrement should be decided as a custody dispute and one should look at where 
the baby would be best placed.37 He uses the best interest of the child test 
espoused in the famous Re Baby M Case to illustrate the same.38 The courts 
should primarily take into consideration the best interest of the child 
principles in granting legal parental rights.  
However, Marsha Garrison contends that legal parentage is a matter that 
requires legislative guidance and laws should be enacted on the same. Laws 
will give a uniform direction where the matter is concerned.39 
1.6 Theoretical Framework 
This paper is centred on the theory of contract espoused by Charles Fried, an 
American jurist and lawyer. He denotes that a contract is a promise which is 
the classical view of the will theory of contract. The latter posits that voluntary 
agreements between rational persons ought to be enforced as expressions of a 
free will's intent to bind itself. 40 He asserts that free men pursue trust as 
unique tool used to serve each other’s’ purpose.41 Altruistic gestational 
                                                        
36 Hisano E.Y, ‘Gestational Surrogacy Maternity Disputes: Refocusing on the Child,’  544. 
37 Russell I.S, ‘Within the Best Interests of the Child: The Factor of Parental Status in Custody 
Disputes Arising from Surrogacy Contracts’ 27 Family Law Review (1988), 616. 
38 In Re Baby M , the Court ruled that the surrogacy contract violated the baby-selling statute; 
thus, it could not be enforced against the mother's wishes and leaves open the impact of the 
statute on a consensual adoption. In the absence of a public policy regarding surrogacy in 
New Jersey, the only rule of law by which this court may be guided is the application of the 
doctrine of the child's best interests in the exercise of its parens patriae jurisdiction. 
39 Garrison, M, ‘Surrogate Parenting: What Should Legislatures Do?’ 22 Family Law 
Quarterly (1988), 165, there is no prudent rationale for failing to provide legislative guidance 
on parental rights in surrogacy contracts. Legislative action on these issues would itself go a 
long way toward resolving the uncertain status of surrogate parenting. 
40 Fried, C, Contract as promise: A theory of contractual obligation, Oxford University Press, 
USA, 2015, 6, see also Atiyah P, Promises, Morals and Law, Oxford University Press, 1981, 
17-28. 
41 Fried, C, ‘Contract as promise: A theory of contractual obligation’, 10, the most palpable 
form of trust is in form of a promise and by promise we transform a choice that was morally 
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surrogacy arrangements proceed from the premise that an obligation is 
established by the existence of voluntary and informed choice to enter into a 
contract. Hence, the defences to the enforcement of a contractual obligation 
must demonstrate a failure of voluntariness or an absence of adequate 
information. Ideally then, the surrogate should only be allowed to breach the 
contract where she was coerced or fraudulently contracted, otherwise her 
willingness to relinquish her rights remains voluntary. This paper does 
however contend that contract law may involve the state in restricting 
contractual freedom by appropriately enforcing legal prohibitions to prevent 
coercive individual behaviour.42  
John Locke’s labor theory proposes an approach that favours the surrogate 
mother as the legal parent to the child. The underlying prunciple of the theory 
is that people own the labor that comes from their own bodies.43 Hence, the 
surrogate can make an argument she gestates the child, nurtures it till birth 
and inevitably forms a special bond with the child. Furthemore, she expends 
labor in bringing forth the child to the world.44 However, this theory is 
rebutted by the fact that the extent of labor is not defined. The commissioning 
parents could argue that they provide the gametes to genetically make up the 
child, they contract the surrogate and provide for her upkeep during the tenure 
of pregnancy. Therefore, they too expend labour.  
                                                        
neutral to one that is morally compelled. When my confidence in your assistance derives from 
my conviction that you will do what is right, then I trust you and trust becomes a powerful 
tool for our working our mutual wills to the world. See also Scheiber H, ‘Law and History 
Review’ in Scheiber H (Ed) the State and Freedom of Contract, Calif Stanford University 
Press, 1998,  the starting point of contract law should be the freedom of contract where the 
parties should be given the liberty to create their own bargains according to the terms they 
want. 
42 Bix B.H, ‘Theories of contract law and enforcing promissory morality: comments on 
Charles Fried’ 45 Suffolk Law Review (2011), 9.   
43 Locke J ‘Second treatise of government.’ Democracy: A Reader, 2001, 27, “man has a 
property in his own person [= ‘owns himself’]; this is something that nobody else has any 
right to. The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are strictly his. So 
when he takes something from the state that nature has provided and left it in, he mixes his 
labour with it, thus joining to it something that is his own.” 
44 Lewis B.C, ‘Enforcing Surrogacy Promises in the Best Interest of the Child’ 87 John's Law 
Review (2013), 914-917, the surrogate starts out with an embryo and puts in the labour to 
change it into a baby. Additionally, during actual labour, the surrogate works to makes sure 




1.7 Hypothesis  
This paper proceeds on the notion that legal parentage in surrogate 
arrangements is not provided for in the current legal framework nor the 
proposed Reproductive Health Care Bill which affords a chapter on the 
regulation of altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements. Secondly, this 
paper also proceeds on the notion that altruistic gestational surrogate 
arrangements should be legally enforced in Kenya.  
1.8 Research Design and Methodology 
The method to be used to gather information for this paper will be through the 
use of the library and internet sources. Data will primarily be sourced from 
secondary sources including scholarly articles, books, journals and reports on 
legal parentage to gestational surrogacy.  
This research paper will conduct a comparative analysis of the legal 
regulatory framework in the United Kingdom and South Africa in order to 
prove or disprove the hypothesis. Kenya is a commonwealth country and as 
such, has derived its common laws and other applicable laws from the United 
Kingdom. Kenyan Courts have also referred to the framework in the United 
Kingdom to decide on surrogacy disputes brought before it.45  
However, there are differences between the United Kingdom and Kenya; in 
the legal structure, cultural practices and most importantly technological state 
of advancement. It is therefore important to establish a middle ground which 
is South Africa. The latter being a fellow African country, with relatively 
similar beliefs and practices as Kenya, would give insight on a reasonable 
approach for Kenya to adopt.46  
1.9 Limitation(s) 
This paper contends that the field of gestational surrogacy in Kenya is broad 
and is coupled by different issues. This paper is limited to evaluating the issue 
                                                        
45 A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General & 5 others, see also J L N & 2 others v Director of 
Children Services & 4 others. 
46 The Children’s Act (Act No. 38 of 2005 of Republic of South Africa) that affords a 
comprehensive legal framework on Surrogate motherhood in Kenya. 
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of legal parentage as a fundamental element to surrogacy. This will ensure a 
comprehensive and exhaustive approach to the issue at hand. 
1.10 Chapter Breakdown 
1) Chapter One 
Introduction to the concept of altruistic gestational surrogacy in Kenya, the 
issue of legal parentage and the proposed methods of research.  
2) Chapter Two 
An extensive analysis of the theoretical framework underpinning altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangements.  
3) Chapter Three  
An analysis of the institution of the family and its evolution, the societal 
concern in altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements (public policy) and 
the application of contractual principles to address these concerns and validate 
these arrangements. 
4) Chapter Four 
A comparative study of the regulatory framework of altruistic gestational 
surrogacy arragements in United Kingdom and South Africa.  
5) Chapter Five 
Recommendations for the legal regulatory framework on the issue of legal 
parentage in altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements in Kenya.  
1.11 Timeline and Duration 





CHAPTER TWO: THE FOUNDATION OF AN 
ALTRUISTIC GESTATIONAL SURROACY AGREEMENT 
2.0 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on a critical examination of the theoretical framework of 
the law of contract and it provides that the law of contract can be used in the 
application of altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements.  
2.1 Law of Contract 
2.1.1 Introduction and Background 
Primarily, the term ‘contract’ was derived from a Latin word Contractum 
which means drawn together.47 A contract refers to an agreement upon which 
there is sufficient consideration to do or not to do a particular thing. Similarly, 
a contract may be defined as an agreement or obligation between parties 
where one party becomes bound to another to pay a sum of money, or to do 
or omit to do a certain act.48  
While agreements have existed in society since time immemorial, the concept 
of contract developed most emphatically during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries with the rise of the industrial revolution and the laissez faire 
doctrine.49 The latter was categorized by a perception that individuals at the 
                                                        
47 http://www.lawsofbusiness.com/2013/04/what-is-contract.html on 11 November 2016. 
48https://thelastbastille.wordpress.com/2013/11/02/contract-legally-define on 11 November 
2016, additionally, it is an agreement between two or more persons, concerning something to 
be done, whereby both parties are bound to each other, or one is bound to the other. See also 
http://dictionary.thelaw.com/contract/ on 11 November 2016 where a contract is defined as, 
“a legally binding agreement involving two or more parties that sets forth an exchange of 
promises of what each party will or will not do. A contract requires two competent parties to 
have a meeting of the minds where there is an offer by one party and an acceptance of that 
offer by the other party, and the consideration for the mutual promises must be something of 
value. 
49 Les-Benedict M, ‘Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins 
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism’ 3 American Society for Legal History (1985), 294 where 
Laissez faire is defined as the admonition that government ought not to interfere with the 
natural laws that govern economic relations. See also Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 
Pearson Longman, 2009, 3-4, the laissez faire doctrine led to the perception of, “a society as 
a collection of self-interested individuals, each of whom was the best judge of their own 
interests, and should, as far as possible, be left alone to pursue those interests.” See also, Viner 
J, ‘The Intellectual History of Laissez Faire’ 3 The Journal of Law & Economics (1960), 50 
where the writings of Thomas Paine (an advocate for less of government interference in 
economic relations) are quoted where he posits, “Natural Society is produced by our wants, 
and government by our the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our 
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time were capable of making their own rational decisions especially in 
commercial transactions with minimal interference from the State or the 
courts. This approach set an important forum for the freedom of contracts as 
it was through these instruments that people entered into self-governing 
transactions. Contracts created obligations and the courts or the state would 
only interfere to enforce these obligations.50  
2.1.2 Tenets of a Valid Contract 
For a contract to be considered valid it must comprise of an agreement 
between parties where the following elements are present:51  
(i) Offer and acceptance 
The contract should be an agreement where an offer is made by one party and 
unequivocally accepted by another party. The agreement may be oral52 or in 
writing.53 An offer is an unequivocal manifestation by one party of its 
intention to contract with another.54 It is important that the offer is definitive 
so that the intention of the offeror is understood clearly as was established in 
the case of Scammel and Nephew Ltd. v. Ouston.55  
                                                        
affections, negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, creates 
distinctions. This first is a patron, the last a punisher. Society in every state is a blessing, but 
government, even in its best a necessary evil.... Government, like dress, is the badge.” 
50Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 4-5 where the freedom of contract is the notion that it 
is parties themselves that are the best judges of their own interests, on the assumption that 
nobody would choose unfavourable terms. The only interference by the courts should only 
be to act as an umpire, holding the parties to their promises; it is not the courts’ role to ask 
whether the bargain made was a fair one.  
51 Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 42.  
52 Section 2(1), Law of Contract Act, Cap 23 (Act No. 43 of 1960) recognizes that English 
Contract Law applies in Kenya which means where the former recognizes oral agreements as 
valid provided the agreements meet the requirements, the same applies to Kenya. 
53 Section 3 (3), Law of Contract Act recognizes that certain agreements for instance those 
relating to dispositions in land must be in writing.  
54 Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 12-13, an offer may take many forms - written, verbal 
or merely implied from conduct. The person making an offer is called the offeror, and the 
person to whom the offer is made is called the offeree. 
55Scammel and Nephew Ltd. v. Ouston [1941] AC 251 HL, where Scammell offered to supply 
a van for £286 on Hire Purchase terms over 2 years and Ouston was to trade in his old van 
for£100. A disagreement occurred between the parties and Scammel refused to supply the 
van. The courts, in deciding if the agreement was valid held it to be void due to uncertainty 
on the terms of the agreement. The meaning of ‘hire purchase terms’ was inconclusive as it 
could be weekly, monthly or even the cost of each instalment hadn’t been determined. 
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Acceptance is the unconditional agreement to all the terms of an offer.56 It is 
at acceptance that the contract comes into existence, usually referred to as the 
point at which there is a meeting of the minds, Consensus ad idem. This means 
that there is an unequivocal offer and acceptance between the parties giving 
rise to consensus and thus an agreement.57  
(ii) Intention to be legally bound by the agreement  
Essentially, an agreement cannot be deemed to legally exist if the parties did 
not intend to create legal relations through it. There is a strong presumption 
that for commercial arrangements the parties do intend to be legally bound58 
whereas for social and domestic agreements, parties do not intend to be legally 
bound.59 However, even social and domestic arrangements may be deemed 
legally binding depending on the nature of the contract and the intention of 
the parties as was held in Errington v Errington Woods60 where the court held 
that there was evidence of an intention to be bound by legal relations even if 
                                                        
56 Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 23, acceptance here is taken to be unconditional since 
if it is conditional it amounts to a counter offer where the terms of the original offer are 
accepted but with certain amendments made to them. For instance in Hyde v Wrench (1840) 
49 ER 132 Chancery Division, the case involved an agreement where Wrench had offered to 
sell a farm to the claimant for £1,000. The claimant in reply offered £950 which the defendant 
refused. Hyde then sought to enforce the original offer of £1,000 instituting an action of 
specific performance when the defendant declined to enforce the agreement. The court held 
that no contract had been created because the claimant gave a qualified acceptance which was 
a counter offer that destroyed the original offer that was there.  
57 Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 where the concept of consensus ad idem was 
determined. Blackburn J set out the following, “if, whatever a man's real intention may be, 
he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that he was assenting to the terms 
proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into the contract with 
him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree 
to the other party's terms.” 
58 Esso Petroleum v Customs & Excise [1976] 1 WLR 1 HL, where the claimant ran a 
promotion whereby any person purchasing four gallons of petrol would get a free coin from 
their World Cup Coins Collection. Esso argued that the coins were simply a free gift and the 
promotion was not intended to have legal effect. The court however held that the context in 
which the coins were offered was a commercial one. Therefore there was an intention to 
create legal relations.  
59 Jones v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328 Court of Appeal where a mother and daughter 
agreed that the former would pay her daughter $200 if she went to London to study for the 
bar. The daughter agreed but did not know that the $200 was in terms of Trinidad dollars and 
not US Dollars. She expected the latter amount. Her mother then decided to buy her a large 
house where the daughter could rent out some rooms and get money to make due. The 
daughter after a while got married and did not finish her studies. Consequently, her mother 
sought repossession of the house. The courts in consideration of whether a legally binding 
contract existed between the two held that it was a domestic arrangement and there was no 
evidence to rebut this. 
60 Errington v Errington Woods [1952] 1 KB 290 (EWCA). 
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the contract was a domestic arrangement.61 Similarly, in Simpkins v Pays62 
where the agreement involved a third party (a lodger), a grandmother and her 
grand-daughter who entered into a weekly competition. The parties agreed 
that if they won anything they would share the amount amongst themselves. 
The grandmother however, on receipt of price money refused to share with 
the rest. The court held that the agreement between the three was enforceable 
despite the family connection.63 
(iii) Capacity to contract 
This is the legal right of each party to contract.64 The latter must be made by 
any person recognised by law as having legal personality which includes both 
natural and legal persons.65 Persons such as minors, drunken persons or 
persons suffering from mental incapacities have limited capacity to contract 
under common law principles.  
a) Minors are generally not bound by the contracts they enter into.66 The 
rationale for this is that they are not considered to have developed the mental 
capacity to contract as was held in R v Oldham.67 However, there are 
expectations, for instance, if it is a contract for necessaries to mean goods 
                                                        
61 Errington v Errington Woods, this was a case where a father bought his son and daughter-
in-law a house to live in. It was agreed that the father would transfer the house to the couple 
if they paid the mortgage installments. Upon the death of the father, the mother of the son 
inherited the house and her son came to live with her. The daughter-in-law however continued 
to pay the mortgage installments. When her mother in law sought to possess the house, the 
court held that a legally binding agreement existed in which the daughter in law was fulfilling 
her obligations by paying the mortgage installments and was therefore entitled to live in the 
house.  
62 Simpkins v Pays [1955] 1 WLR 975. 
63 Simpkins v Pays. 
64 http://www.lawteacher.net/cases/contract-law/capacity-cases.php on 13 November 2016. 
65 Adriano E, ‘The Natural Person, Legal Entity or Juridical Person and Juridical Personality,’ 
4 Pennsylvania State Journal of Law & International Affairs (2015), 366, “a natural person 
refers to a human being, who is an individual being capable of assuming obligations and 
capable of holding rights while a legal person is an entity endowed with juridical personality 
who are usually known as a collective person, social person or legal entity.” 
66 Section 2, The Children’s Act (No 8. of 2001), a child is defined as any person under the 
age of eighteen (18) years. 
67R v Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Garlick 2 All ER 65 (1993) where the 
House of Lords in considering whether a child under the age of ten (10) years could contract 
to occupy residential premises held, “the laws on the validity of contracts made by minors 
could only apply if they were old enough to understand the nature of the transaction and the 
nature of any continuing obligations incurred.” 
15 
 
suitable to the condition in life of the minor or other person, and to his actual 
requirements at the time of the sale and delivery.68 
b) Persons who suffer from mental illnesses or even drunken persons are 
actually bound by the contracts they enter into.69 However, if it is evident that 
at the time the contract was made, the drunk/mentally-ill party is incapable of 
understanding the nature and implications of the transaction and the other 
party knows of this, such contract will be deemed voidable70 at the option of 
the drunk/mentally-ill person as was held in Hart v O’Connor.71 
(iv) Formalities  
Generally, a contract need not take any particular form, and it may be oral or 
in writing. However, parties often contract in writing due to the assurance of 
having the agreement in writing as opposed to a verbal agreement.72 
Furthermore, there are certain contracts that must be in writing or can only be 
evidenced in writing. For instance, in Kenya, Section 3 of the Law of Contract 
                                                        
68 Section 4, Sale of goods act Cap 31 (Act No. 1 of 2012). See also Nash v Inman [1908] 2 
KB 1 where a tailor sold some fancy coats to a minor who refused to pay for them and held 
that he was a minor at the time the agreement was made thus it could not be enforced against 
him. The court held that although the goods were indeed suitable to the minor’s condition in 
life, they were not suitable to his actual requirements at the time because his father gave 
evidence indicating that his son had  a wardrobe full of coats and was not in need of more 
coats. 
69 Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 75. 
70 The distinction between void and voidable was observed in De Renevillev De Reneville 
[1946] 1 All ER 56, CA where Lord Greene in considering whether a marriage contract was 
void or voidable held, “a void marriage is one that is regarded by every court in any case in 
which the existence of the marriage is in issue as never having taken place while a voidable 
one is regarded by the courts as a valid substituting marriage until a decree annulling it has 
been pronounced.” Even though this case focuses on marriage contracts, the concept of void 
and voidable contracts applies where the former is considered valid until a party terminates it 
or an order is given to terminate the contract but for the latter it is considered an invalid 
contract from the onset.  
71 Hart v O’Connor (1985) UKPC 1 where an agreement was entered into between a buyer 
and a seller but the former did not know of the latter’s mental unsoundness at the time of 
contracting. The Privy Council held that that the person of unsound mind was bound by his 
agreement. See also Gore v. Gibson (1845) in which “the court held that the defendant was 
not liable on a bill of exchange which he had indorsed at a time when he was, to the knowledge 
of the plaintiff, so drunk that he could not appreciate the meaning, nature or effect of the 
endorsement.” 
72 Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 83. See also Hadley v Kemp [1999] EMLR 589 where 
the defendant was sued by members of a singing group for royalties received under the group. 
The claimants sued on the basis of an oral agreement but because they were unable to prove 
its existence the action failed.  
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Act posits that certain contracts must be in writing.73 For example, a contract 
for the disposition of an interest in land.74 
Similarly, certain contracts must be evidenced in writing, which means that 
contract itself need not be in writing but there must be some written evidence 
of the transaction. For instance, contracts of guarantee where a one party 
guarantees the obligation of another.75  
(v) Consideration  
A myriad of authorities have explored what the term ‘consideration’ means. 
To begin with, in 1875, Lush J in Currie v Missa76defined it as, “some right, 
interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, 
detriment, loss, or responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the other.” 
Likewise, Dunedin L.J in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge & Co 
Ltd77 defined it as, “an act or forbearance of one party, or the promise thereof, 
is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus 
given for value is enforceable.”78 Simply put, consideration is that which 
represents either a benefit one party or detriment to the other party or both.79 
The importance of consideration in a contract has been viewed as the evidence 
indicating the intention of the parties to be bound as was observed in Antons 
Trawling Co Ltd v Smith80 where consideration was held to be a valuable 
signal that the parties intend to be bound by the agreement.  
                                                        
73 Section 3, Law of Contract Act.  
74 Section 3(3), Law of Contract Act, see also Ruddick v Ormston [2005] EWHC 2547 where 
the court ruled against a claim for specific performance of a contract of properties because 
the parties had not entered into a written agreement and therefore there was no valid contract.  
75 Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 85. 
76 Currie v Misa 1875-76 LR 1 App Cas 55. 
77 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge & Co Ltd [1951] UKHL. 
78 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd. v. Selfridge & Co Ltd. 
79 Elliot C and Quinn F, Contract Law, 89, see also Thomas v Thomas [1842] 2 QB 851 where 
it was defined as, “something which is of some value in the eye of the law, moving from the 
plaintiff: It may be some benefit to the defendant, or some detriment to the plaintiff, but at all 
events it must be moving from the plaintiff.” See also Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 
[1892] EWCA Civ 1 where an example of consideration was given to be that which is 
constituted by a benefit accruing to one party and a detriment suffered by the other party. 




2.2 Theory of Contract  
To begin with, the law of contract is based on different theories that are used 
to explain the basis of contract law. These theories give views that indicate 
when legal contractual obligations arise and when they do not. For the purpose 
of altruistic gestational surrogacy contracts, this paper analyses the theory of 
contract under three limbs; the analytical question, normative question and a 
convergence of both referred to as the consent theory of contract.81  
2.2.1 Analytical Theory of Contract 
The analytic question answers what constitutes a contractual obligation and 
this is observed under two principles, the promissory and reliance principles. 
i) Promissory Principle  
Essentially, the promise principle posited by Charles Fried82 is argued to be 
the basis of contract law in his book, ‘Contract as a Promise.’83 A promise can 
be understood as “the communication made of an intention to undertake a 
particular obligation.” Therefore, the promissory principle denotes that 
contracts involve promises that create legally binding obligations on the 
parties who make these promises.84 
Fried posits that a promise also has a moral backing to it, as it places an 
obligation to accomplish a particular task which is morally compelling often 
referred to as the will theory.85 While promises lead to moral obligations, there 
is more justification required to make a contract legally binding. This is why 
                                                        
81 Smith S, Contract Theory, Oxford University Press, 2004, 43-45.  
82 Charles Fried is an American jurist and lawyer who is currently a professor at Harvard 
University. He is well known for his expertise in civil and contract law.  
83 Fried C, Contract as promise: A theory of contractual obligation, Oxford University Press, 
United States of America, 2015, 1.  
84 Valente D, ‘Enforcing Promises Consideration and Intention in the Law of Contract’ a 
dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree of Bachelor of Laws (Honours), 
University of Otago, October 2010, 3. See also Bix B, ‘Contract Law Theory’ 06-12 
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper Series (2006), 9 where contracts are defined as 
promises, and one has a moral and legal obligation to keep one’s promises.  
85 Fried C, Contract as promise: A theory of contractual obligation, 8, “the device that gives 
trust its sharpest, most palatable form is promise. By promising we put in another man’s hands 
a new power to accomplish his will. By promising we transform a choice that was morally 
neutral to morally binding/compelling one.” 
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contracts not only create moral duties but legal ones enforceable under the 
law.86  
On the one hand, this legal backing gives the promisee a right to enforce the 
promise where it is not fulfilled through claims of breach of contract leading 
to damages, restirtuion and other measures of redress.87 On the hand, the 
promise must be unequivocal, therefore, the promisor must not be bound to 
fulfill a promise he made mistakenly or a promise that was fradulently induced 
or where fulfillment of the promise is frustrated; commonly referred to as 
vitiating elements of a contract.88 
The promissory principle has however been criticised as a mere moral 
obligatgory theory which is legally non enforceable.89 It has been argued it is 
difficult to establish at times the will of the promisor showing his or her intent 
to fulfill the contractual obligation.90 Similarly, to be different from what the 
law of contract entails since consideration is a vital element validating a 
contract while promises merely entail moral communications to do particular 
tasks.91 Charles Fried adresses these arguments where he asserts two key 
notions;  
i) Consideration need not be adequate, the law is only concerned that 
there is an exhange between the parties. For instance in Hamer v 
Sidway92 where a nephew was promised by his uncle that if he quit 
smoking and drinking till his twenty first birthday, he would get five 
                                                        
86 Valente D, ‘Enforcing Promises Consideration and Intention in the Law of Contract’ 3.  
87 For example in Security Stove & Mfg Co. v American Railway Express Co Missouri Court 
of Appeals [1932] where the defendant was to deliver to the plaintiff a stove that the latter 
wanted to showcase at a convention. The defendant failed to do this in time and the plaintiff 
instituted a claim seeking damages. Court held that the plaintiff as entitled to redress.  
88 Fried C, Contract as promise: A theory of contractual obligation, 20, see also Onyekachi 
D, ‘Vitiating elements of a contract as a source of contract validity’ (2012), 2-3, available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2156749 10 November 2016 where 
vitiating factors are explained as “factors that make a contract void or voidable. These include 
mistake, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence and illegality. The nature of the vitiating 
element determines the kind of defect the contract may have, the contract may not be 
enforceable at all or it may be enforceable in certain ways.” 
89 Smith S, Contract Theory, 44. 
90 Barnett R, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract,’ 86 Columbia Law Review (1986), 274, “the 
inability of will theories to explain adequately the enforcement of objective manifestations of 
intention also accounts in part for the continued interest in reliance-based theories of 
contractual obligation.” 
91 Barnett R, ‘Some Problems with Contract as Promise,’ 77 Cornell Law Review (1992), 
1025-1026. 
92 Louisa Hamer v Franklin Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
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thousand dollars. The nephew complied with this but his uncle’s 
executor refused to pay the amount claiming that it was a mere 
promise made with no consideration thus not legally binding. The 
courts held for the nephew in that his forbearance from smoking and 
drinking was sufficient onsideration.  
ii) A mere promise turns into a contractual obligation where there is the 
promise of something given in exchange for something usually 
referred to as a bargain. Contracts entail mutual exchanges where 
parties agree to undertake certain obligations from which they benefit 
from.93 
iii) Reliance Principle 
The reliance principle posits that where one party induces another to rely on 
the enforcement of a certain obligation, it may be deemed binding.94 It is 
closely linked to the reasonable expectations that arise causing one to rely on 
enforcement of the promise. Courts adopt an objective standard to assess 
reasonability and judge whether a party is entitled to any redress.95   
This principle is however criticised as weak and a generality since any 
promise made gives rise to an expectation but this does not necessarily make 
it a contract. It is important to note that this is precisely why courts adopt an 
objective criteria to the reliance test assuming that there must first be in 
existence a valid contract where the parties intended to be legally bound since 
the question is not whether the reliance creates a contract but whether an 
agreement existed in which reasonable expectations could arise.  
                                                        
93 Smith S, Contract Theory, 110, the concept of mutual exchanges is usually likened to the 
efficiency theories of contract law where two persons make a voluntary exchange and the 
exchange will make each better off, and is therefore efficient. However, it is important to note 
that there are contacts that are enforceable that do not make both parties better off thus are 
not mutually beneficial. But even with these contracts, voluntary exchanges take place.  
94 Smith S, Contract Theory, 44. 
95 Valente D, ‘Enforcing Promises Consideration and Intention in the Law of Contract’, 4; 
where justification is given for the reliance principle. Courts enforce it to protect the promisee 
who may have made steps on reliance of this promise. For example, “the promisor, by making 
the promise, gives the promisee hope that it will be performed. If the promisor fails to 
perform, it causes a sense of injury or deprivation in the promisee.” 
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2.2.2 Normative Theory of Contract  
Having established what constitutes a contractual obligation, the normative 
theory of contact looks into the justification to legally enforce such obligation. 
It analyses what justifies a promise as a legally binding obligation.  
(i) Efficiency theory  
Essentially, the efficiency theory is a utility based theory premised on the 
notion of making parties better off and promoting the overall welfare of the 
parties.96 The justification for contracts and the enforcement of contractual 
obligations is that it makes the parties better off. The efficiency theory is 
closely linked to the classical view of utilitarianism posited by Jeremy 
Bentham as the pain-pleasure principle where he averred for the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people.97 However, the application of 
economic analysis to legal rules has been criticised. Critics argue that where 
the efficiency theory proposes that which is best for the welfare of the society 
or even the parties themselves means there is an external moderator or judge 
of that which is best. Likewise, to arrive at a situation where parties are made 
better off would mean that negotiations take place, effective mutual 
bargaining and inevitably unequivocal consent from both parties. Therefore, 
efficiency theories are supplemented by other elements to justify the 
enforcement of contractual obligations.98 
                                                        
96 Smith S, Contract Theory, 47, see also Cooter R and Ulen T, Law and Economics, Berkeley 
Law Books, 2016, 14, in economic terms, efficiency is popularly defined in regards to the 
“Pareto efficiency or allocative efficiency where a situation is impossible to change it so as 
to make at least one person better off (in his own estimation) without making another person 
worse off (again, in his own estimation).” 
97 Freeman M, ‘Bentham, Austin and classical English positivism,’ in Lloyd D, Introduction 
to Jurisprudence, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994, 249, pain pleasure principle was based on a set of 
measures of happiness and pain. That which led to happiness for the greatest number of 
people was sought as the better option under this principle. It has been criticised for being 
instrumental and for not taking into account that certain things cannot be measured or 
weighed.  
98 Barnett R, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract,’ 283, consent may be evident from the 
following: the conduct of persons with their words, their conduct and words in one context 
with those in another, or (3) one person's conduct and words with another person's conduct 
and words. See also Brilmayer L ‘Consent, Contract and Territory’ Faculty Scholarship 
Series Paper (1989), 21, consent is based on an individual’s voluntary choice over other 
choices however, in contracts a further step is taken where this choice binds that individual 
to a legal contractual obligation.  
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(ii) The Rights Principle   
The rights dogma posits that contractual obligations give legal effect and 
protection to individual rights. This entails a respect for such rights where 
their infringement results in legal redress through damages or special 
performance.99 
2.2.3 Consent Theory of Contract  
Primarily, consent can be understood as, “the voluntary acquiescence to the 
proposal of another that entails a concurrence of minds and will.”100 Consent 
theory is based on the vital requirement of a rights holder to unequivocally 
agree to the valid transfer of their individual rights creating a binding 
contractual obligation to do so. 101 Barnett Roberts in his article that focusses 
on the consent theory of contract asserts that,  
“the consent theory specifies that a promisor incurs a contractual obligation 
the legal enforcement of which is morally justifiable by manifesting assent to 
legal enforcement and thereby invoking the institution of contract.”102  
The consent theory contemplates both a subjective and objective element to 
determine the existence of a contractual obligation, which is actually a blend 
of the analytical and normative theories discussed above.103 Traditionally, 
contracts were tools that gave effect to party autonomy by actualizing the 
intentions of the parties to the contract.  However, the intention of the parties 
in itself may not always be sufficient to legally enforce a contractual 
obligation since it may be difficult to prove this intention (subjective element). 
Therefore, under the consent theory, the intentions of the parties are to be 
                                                        
99 Smith S, Contract Theory, 47.  
100 http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/consent  on 11 November 2016.  
101 Barnett R, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract,’ 301, the consent theory may be confused for 
the will theory that denotes the promissory principle. However, the two are distinct in that the 
will theory morally binds one to a contractual obligation irrespective of whether the promisor 
had the intention to be bound in the first place while the consent theory requires that consent 
whether express or implied be made before any rights are transferred or assumed to be 
transferred. Therefore, under the consent theory the intention to create legal relations is not 
only morally binding but legally too as it satisfies the objective (legal) and the subjective 
(moral) elements.  
102 Barnett R, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract,’ 305. 
103 Perillo J, ‘The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation,’ 
69 Fordham Law Review (2000), 427. 
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ascertained from their words and conduct rather than their unexpressed 
intentions, (objective element).104 
2.3 Application to Altruistic Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements 
This paper posits that the determination of legal parentage under altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangements should be based on the consent theory of 
contract. The latter provides a situation where the parties voluntarily and 
unequivocally intend to contract (subjective) but there is evidence of this 
intention that may include signing of the agreement and the presence of 
witnesses or the conduct of the parties (objective). In circumstances where 
there is both the subjective and objective element of the contract, then a 
contractual obligation is created that legally binds both parties.  
2.4 Critique of the Contractual Theory  
It is not disputed that the contractual theory has its flaws, a key one being that 
if applied to altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements, the latter could 
easily be turned into an exploitative tool through the commercial element of 
a contract. This has been a major argument against the enforcement of 
gestational surrogacy arrangements as contracts.105 However, altruistic 
surrogacy arrangements can still be enforced without formal consideration 
under the doctrine of promissory estoppel which has been explored above 
under the promissory theory of contract espoused by Charles Fried. 
Likewise, it is not only the contractual theory that can be used to support the 
enforcement of altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements. As highlighted 
in Chapter one, the right to family is a fundamental human right embodied in 
Article 45 (1) of the Constitution as well as other international instruments 
like the UDHR.106 From a human rights perspective, altruistic gestational 
surrogacy arrangements provide an avenue through which the right to family 
is realized for all people including couples that cannot beget children through 
                                                        
104 Perillo J, ‘The Origins of the Objective Theory of Contract Formation and Interpretation,’ 
430 while contracts as stated above are effective tools for the respect of party autonomy , the 
proof of the existence of this contractual intent is rooted in objective elements like what the 
parties signed or whether there were any witness. Consequently, the existence of a contractual 
obligation relies on both subjective (intent) and objective elements.  
105 Brinig M, ‘A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's 
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement’ 2380. 
106 Article 45(1), Constitution, Article 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
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natural means. Additionally, gestational surrogacy involves the transfer of 
gametes of the intending couple to the womb of the surrogate meaning the 
surrogate has no genetic link to the child and the couple simply transfer their 
rights to the child to the surrogate during the period of gestation. It can be 
argued as will be seen in the next chapter, that even if a surrogate bears no 
genetic link to the child, she could still get attached to the baby and feel 
entitled to parental rights over it. This is precisely why a clear cut regulatory 
framework is necessary with regard to the enforcement of these arrangements. 
For instance in countries like South Africa, one of the requirements to validate 
an altruistic gestational surrogacy agreement is that the surrogate must have 
had one viable pregnancy, with a child of her own, before entering into a 
gestational surrogacy arrangement.107 
In the same vein, a long standing practice has been established in Kenya where 
communities would enforce obligations arising from gestational surrogacy 
arrangements as binding on the parties. Often, barren women would enter into 
woman-woman marriages for the primary purpose of getting children who 
would be considered the children of the barren woman even though the “other 
woman in the marriage gave birth to the children.”108  
Summarily, as posited by Justice Majanja, surrogacy is not a hypothetical 
issues in Kenya, it is real and the onus is on the state to come up with an 
effective framework to guide these arrangements.109 While it is acknowledged 
that the law of contract would require certain parameters to be safeguarded in 
the law to ensure the interests of justice are met, the right to family embodied 
in the Kenyan Constitution and the long standing practice shown where 
communities have indeed practiced gestational surrogacy and enforced the 
terms of such agreements for a long period of time shows the undeniable 
intention for parties that enter into these arrangements to be bound by such 
agreements.  
  
                                                        
107 Section 295 (c), Children’s Act. 
108 Alsaker K, ‘When African women take wives: A Historical Overview’5-6. 
109 J L N & 2 others v Director of Children Services & 4 others [2014 
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CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS OF THE 
STATE/SOCIETAL INTEREST IN ALTRUISTIC 
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY 
3.0 Introduction  
In light of the fact that the right to family enshrined in Article 45 (2) of the 
Constitution is an instrumental factor for the enforcement of altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangements, this chapter gives a comprehensive 
analysis of the institution and role of the family in society, the societal interest 
in altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements and consequently this chapter 
examines whether the application of contractual principles in line with 
altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements are in line with public policy in 
Kenya.   
3.1 Institution of the Family  
3.1.1 Introduction and Background 
To begin with, the word ‘family’ comes from the Roman term ‘familia’ which 
referred to the “interests of a tightly-knit and exclusive group of persons, 
familia was a unit with an adult male Roman, (pater familias) lawfully 
married, with children born to him and his wife (or successive wives) together 
with the children of their children through many generations.”110 In some 
contexts family today is persons sharing blood relations while in other 
contexts it refers to members of a household or both.111 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) defines family as the natural and 
fundamental group unit of society entitled to protection by society and the 
State.112 
                                                        
110 Borg K, ‘A Comparative Analysis Of The Concept Of ‘Family’ Faculty Of Laws (2006), 
34, see also Brewer P, Frederick Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State: Introduction by Pat Brewer, Resistance Books, New South Wales, 2008, 11 where the 
word ‘family’ was considered to come from the Latin term famulus which means household 
slave, and familia, the totality of slaves belonging to one man, the patriarch, who inherited all 
the wealth and wielded absolute power over all members of the household. This shift towards 
gender inequality was presented as a natural, not a social process.” Similarly, Fredrick Engel 
describes the family as the social organisation of reproduction and production of daily life at 
all stages of human society. 
111 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Family+(sociology) on 10 November 2016.  
112 Article 16 (3), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 217 A (III) see also Article 23, 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 19 December 1966. 
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Historically, society was in a primitive state characterised by egalitarian, 
social and sexual relations, collective production and communal ownership of 
property. This was a phase where people engaged in sexual relations freely 
and with no restrictions. However, with time came the development of a social 
organisation where members of the community could trace their bloodlines 
and kinship ties.113 The institution of the family developed under four key 
forms;114 the consanguine family where for so long as you were a member 
of a certain generation, sexual relations with members of the same generation 
was permitted,115 the punaluan family which restricted sexual relations 
between brothers and sisters as well as parents and children,116 the pairing 
family where one man chose his wife and belonged to her but was still 
allowed to practice polygamy and the monogamous family where the main 
purpose was to produce children but with no issues of paternity so that 
children could inherit their fathers’ property. Thus, laws were created to make 
monogamous marriages binding and their dissolution characterised by several 
complex formalities.117 
3.1.2 Evolution of the Family  
The initial concept of the monogamous family has evolved over the years and 
with it so has the institution of marriage. The industrial revolution that 
characterised the 18th and 19th century played an instrumental role in this 
paradigm shift as women became more involved in social and economic 
work.118  Consequently, acts like the Married Women Property Act119 
recognized that a wife could own property separate from her husband.120 
                                                        
113 Brewer P, Frederick Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State: 
Introduction by Pat Brewer, 10-11. 
114 Brewer P, Frederick Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State: 
Introduction by Pat Brewer, 52. 
115 The consanguine family is considered extremely rare today, some even argue that it was 
become extinct with traces of its existence in Hawaiian family systems only.  
116 The Punaluan family is linked to an Indian Tribe called Punalua that practiced this kind of 
family system. 
117 The monogamous family was based on the supremacy of the man and his need to produce 
children of his own with no dispute claims over the child. The role of the woman was merely 
secondary leading to the doctrine of coverture where her legal identity was subsumed into 
that of the husband’s. See also William & Glyn’s Bank Ltd v Boland [1979] where Lord 
Denning posited the following, “the law regarded the husband and wife as one and the 
husband as that one.” 
118 Paola G, ‘The Role of Women in Society: from Preindustrial to Modern Times’ 
61.1 CESifo Economic Studies (2015), 15-17. 
119 Married Women Property Act, 18 August 1882. 
120 Section 17, Married Women Property Act. 
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Similarly in Kenya, cases like Kamore v Kamore where the court held that 
property acquired jointly during the subsistence of a marriage belongs to both 
parties equally.121  
With these changes in mind, the family institution is no longer an organ 
spearheaded solely by the man. Initially, men led since they held the wealth 
that they could bequeath to their children, however, presently, women can 
acquire wealth too and do have rights to bequeath this wealth to their 
children.122 These changes are also reflected in the status of the woman who 
now has equal rights over several factors as the man before, during and even 
after the subsistence of marriage.123 Some of these rights include that of 
owning and selling property, bequeathing or inheriting property or entering 
into legally binding agreements.124  
3.2 Societal Interest in Altruistic Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements 
In light of the fact that these agreements involve the inception of new life into 
the family unit and inevitably the society, the latter plays an instrumental role 
where altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements are concerned.  
3.2.1 Moral and Ethical Issues  
Essentially, the proliferation of most of the modern contraceptive 
technologies125 have raised several moral and ethical issues in society. These 
issues have been the centre of debate in deciding whether altruistic gestational 
surrogacy agreements should be enforceable as well as the binding force of 
the terms of the agreement.  
                                                        
121 Kamore v Kamore [2000] eKLR, see also Peter Mburu Echaria v Priscilla Njeri Echaria 
[2007] eKLR where the courts even proposed that laws be enacted to outline how matrimonial 
property should be shared. See also Kivuitu v Kivuitu [1991] eKLR where the courts held that 
property held jointly in a marriage with no way of ascertaining who own what interest is to 
be shared between the parties equally. 
122 Brewer P, Frederick Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State: 
Introduction by Pat Brewer, 81. 
123 Section 3(2), The Marriage Act (Act No.4 of 2014). 
124 Paola G, ‘The Role of Women in Society: from Preindustrial to Modern Times’, 16, see 
alsohttp://www.familiesandsocieties.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2014/12/WP11OlahEtAl2014.pd
f on 8th September 2016 where the role of women in the modern society is highlighted as 
having incorporated dimensions of economic independence and support responsibilities that 
for a while were taken up by men. 
125 Andrews L, ‘The Stork Market: The Law of the New Reproduction Technologies’ 70 
American Bar Association Journal (1984), 50, some of these technologies include: in vitro 
fertilization techniques or sperm donation.  
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(i) Commodification of Women  
This is an issue raised by feminists who see surrogacy arrangements as a 
means of exploiting women.126 It is argued that women who act as surrogates 
are vulnerable and chosen from backgrounds where women are likely to be 
exploited because they do not understand the nature and implications of 
surrogacy arrangements; they are chosen due to their beauty or reproductive 
capacity making them tools of reproduction and degrading the natural order 
of reproduction.127  
On the other hand, neither the surrogate nor the commissioning couple is 
forced into these agreements and even if they were, then the agreement ceases 
to be an enforceable one but a agreement vitiated by coercion.128 Therefore, 
valid surrogacy agreement are underpinned by an element of voluntariness on 
both parties. Furthermore, commercial surrogacy has been banned by several 
countries across the world129 including Kenya in its proposed regulatory 
framework for gestational surrogacy, it only recognises altruistic surrogacy 
which does not require the surrogate to be paid any fees.130 
(ii) ‘Baby Selling’ Market 
Gestational surrogacy arrangements are argued to create a forum for a ‘baby 
selling market’ no different from the process of adoption. Babies are likened 
                                                        
126 Brinig M, ‘A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard Epstein's 
Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement’ 2380. 
127 Scott E, ‘Surrogacy and The Politics Of Commodification,’ 72 Duke University School of 
Law (2009),110, this fear can be likened especially to women who come from developing 
countries where are easily a subject of exploitation since they can be duped into these 
arrangements by either coercion or lack of knowledge thereof what they may be getting 
themselves into.  See also Baby M Case where it was agreed that women do have a right to 
choose what they do to their own bodies but the concerns of exploitation of women where 
surrogacy arrangements are involved cannot be ignored. In this case, feminist advocates 
fought for Ms. Whitehead, the surrogate, to get parental rights, because in their view, the 
surrogacy arrangement between Ms. Whitehead and the Sterns was an exploitative tool.   
128 Elliott C and Quinn F, Contract law, 252, contracts must be entered into voluntarily by 
both parties which is represented by valid consent given by parties to the contact; if not the 
contract is voidable. See also Epstein A, ‘Surrogacy: the case for full contractual 
enforcement’ 2328, the fact that contracts have certain rules that make them valid like 
principles of offer and acceptance does not mean that all contracts are universal. Contracts 
are all different because of the different subject matter each pertains to; therefore to conclude 
that a surrogacy contract is a mode of commodification of children is a false assertion because 
children are not goods or services nor can they ever be commodified. Just because a surrogacy 
contact appreciates the rules of contact does not mean that the value of the subject matter is 
negated in any way.  
129 States like New-York have declared any type of commercial surrogacy agreement void 
and unenforceable.   
130 Section 14, Reproductive Health Care Bill.  
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to goods and services as the subject matter of the surrogacy agreement. This 
creates a perception that children can be sold thereby degrading human life.131 
However, the conception and existence of a baby is only assured after the 
execution of a gestational surrogacy agreement.132 Most importantly, the 
subject matter of the arrangement is the surrender of parental rights and not 
the sale of a baby.133 The surrogate has no baby when the arrangement is 
entered into nor does she have any parental rights.134  
(iii) Comparison to Prostitution 
It has been argued that these arrangement s can be likened to prostitution as 
the sale of female sexuality. These arrangements exploit the surrogate by 
enticing them with money for their reproductive capacity. 135  Just like 
prostitution, these are arrangements concluded in the absence of free will and 
rational choice since the surrogate is guided by the monetary value of the 
arrangement.136 
For one, this argument undermines the capacity of a woman to be autonomous 
and rational enough to choose to do with her body as she pleases. It instead 
pre-supposes that women are incapable of entering into enforceable 
                                                        
131 Lieber K, ‘Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of Surrogacy Be Answered?’ 68 
Indiana Law Journal (1992), 217. 
132 Lascarides D, ‘A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts’ 25 
Hofstra Law Review (1997), 1241-1243. 
133 In Johnson v Calvert the court reasoned that a surrogacy arrangement is very different 
from adoption. No fee is paid to the surrogate nor does she have any baby at the time the 
contract is concluded. The purpose of the contract is to effect the surrender of parental rights 
to an intending couple once the baby is born.  
134 Posner R, ‘The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood,’ 
5 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy (1989), 28, “additionally, the baby is not 
owned by the surrogate because even the genetic father has a right to his baby. The surrogate 
mother no more "owns" the baby than the father does. See also Lascarides D, ‘A Plea for the 
Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts,’1241, having established that the baby is 
not in existence at the time the contract is executed, meaning the baby cannot be an existing 
good. It is also important to note that parental rights as well do not exist at the time the contract 
is concluded, therefore no party has a right to any existing future good since such rights must 
be held when contract is being executed. Hence, gestational surrogacy contracts are not for 
the sale of any type of goods but for the surrender of parental rights.” 
135 Posner R, ‘The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood,’ 
27. 
136 Sera J, ‘Surrogacy and prostitution: A comparative analysis’ 5 Journal of Gender and the 
Law (1996), 319, “surrogacy contracts are seen as coercive involuntary tools even if the 
woman makes the choice to contract, it is not always that women make choices that are in 
their best self-interest. Some feminists have viewed this arrangements as an opportunity for 
men to exploit women and make them a class of breeders.”   
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arrangements on their own.137 Secondly, it is not just the surrogate in this 
arrangement but another woman too with the incapability to procreate.138 
Moreover, to assume surrogates enter into these agreements because of a 
monetary desire is false since altruistic surrogacy arrangements139 do not 
require the surrogate to be paid any fee.  
3.2.2 Public Policy 
Primarily, there are various definitions given to the term ‘public policy.’ For 
instance, Thomas Dye defines it as “that which the government chooses to do 
or not to do” while Carl J. Friedrich views it as a proposed course of action of 
a person, group or government within a given environment providing 
opportunities and obstacles which the policy was proposed to utilise and 
overcome in an effort to realise an objective or purpose.”140 Similarly, public 
policy was considered in Christ for all Nations v Apollo Insurance Co. 
Ltd141where Ringera J stated that in Kenya an act is contrary to public policy 
if it is either: 
“(a) Inconsistent with the constitution or other laws of Kenya, whether written 
or unwritten; or (b) inimical to the national interest of Kenya; or (c) contrary 
to justice or morality. The first category is clear enough. In the second 
category I would without claiming to be exhaustive include the interests of 
national defence and security, good diplomatic relations with friendly nations, 
and the economic prosperity of Kenya. In the third category, I would, again 
without seeking to be exhaustive, include such considerations as whether the 
award was induced by corruption or fraud or whether it was founded on a 
arrangement contrary to public morals.”142 
                                                        
137 Posner R, ‘The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood,’ 
27. 
138 Parties would not enter the surrogate agreement without the need to. It is not the surrogate 
who goes out looking for a baby but an intending couple that goes out of its way to contract 
a surrogate because they want a chance at procreation and a family. Furthermore, the 
surrogate enters an altruistic arrangement not for money or other gains but to simply gestate 
a baby for an intending couple, thereafter surrender the rights to them. 
139 These form of surrogacy is widely accepted as the proposed model for Kenya.  
140http://www.hss.ruh.ac.lk/homepages/lecture_notes/Sabaragamuwa%20Lecturers/Introduc
tion%20to%20Public%20polcy.pdf on 10 November 2016, see also Mackay M, 
‘Understanding and Applying Basic Public Policy Concepts’ University of Guelph (2011), 1. 
141 Christ for all Nations v Apollo Insurance Co. Ltd [2002] eKLR. 
142 Christ for all Nations v Apollo Insurance Co. Ltd. 
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Often, the enforcement of altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements is 
opposed due to the third limb highlighted in Justice Ringera’s analysis, the 
moral and ethical issues. These arrangements are held to be against public 
policy due to the moral concerns they raise. Furthermore, the issue of legal 
parentage in altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements is mainly based on 
the level of interference that the state or society may have in private matters. 
On the one hand, an argument could be made that family affairs are far too 
important to be left to the will of individuals especially where a decision is to 
be made on the legal parent of a child.  On the other hand, an argument could 
similarly be made that family affairs are private and therefore, there should be 
minimal or no interference at all.143  
3.3 Application of Contractual Principles to Validate Altruistic 
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements 
 
i) Concern of the state and the society  
To begin with, the state and the society both have a primary interest in the 
care and protection of children.144 With this in mind, it is important to note 
that a surrogacy arrangement would not be entered into if the parties did not 
have the child’s best interest. Based on the theory of contract explored in 
chapter 2, neither the commissioning couple nor the surrogate enter into a 
valid contractual altruistic gestational surrogacy agreement accidentally or 
unintended but consensually. Therefore, it is undisputed that all parties 
concerned want the best for the child, undeniably then, an altruistic gestational 
surrogacy arrangement does in fact take into account the state’s concern in 
care and protection of the child.145  
Societal concerns are also raised over the commercialization of the process 
(the baby selling market). In the case of the latter, altruistic gestational 
surrogacy arrangements are non-commercial and the only payments made are 
                                                        
143 Carbone J, ‘The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy 
Contracts’ 28 Santa Clara Law Review (1988), 582. 
144 Article 53 (2), Constitution of Kenya highlights that the best interests of the child are of 
paramount importance, see also Article 53 (e), Constitution of Kenya which posits that every 
child is entitled to parental care and protection. Likewise, under Article 53(a) every child has 
a right to a name and nationality from birth (legal identity). 




for the subsistence of the pregnancy.146 Likewise, in comparison to the 
regulatory frameworks highlighted in Chapter 4 from other jurisdictions,147 
there are certain requirements that must be met before parties enter into an 
altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangement, for example, the arrangement 
must not be a source of income for any of the parties.148  
ii) Equality of the Parties Bargaining Power 
An argument is made that surrogacy arrangements impose a burden on a 
woman to make a futuristic decision and be bound by it. This is without 
concern of the un-anticipated changes that may take place putting her at an 
unequal position to the other party. This argument fails to appreciate the fact 
that this is precisely where certain requirements must be met before the 
conclusion of an altruistic surrogacy arrangement like ensuring the surrogate 
is well informed and makes a free consensual decision to gestate and give up 
her parental rights.149 Similarly, contractual principles are there to impose the 
minimum conditions that ensure that arrangements entered into are valid. 
Therefore, provided there is free consent, informed choice, freedom from 
coercion or duress and sufficient evidence to ensure the surrogate does not 
enter into the arrangement due to financial constrains then the arrangement is 
valid and the parties should be held liable to perform their obligations.150 
iii) Validity of Surrogate Mother’s Consent  
Closely linked to the issue of the bargaining power of the parties, concerns 
are also raised over the consent of the surrogate mother and whether she 
should be bound by a decision made to give up parental rights prior to 
hormonal and emotional changes characterized by pregnancy. Truly, it makes 
sense that one may have changed one’s mind even in other contracts, one may 
decide to buy a house today and a different one tomorrow. However, as 
Richard Posner rightly puts it, information costs are involved in the formation 
                                                        
146 Section 14, Reproductive Health Care Bill. 
147 Chapter 4 of this paper gives an analysis of the regulatory frameworks for altruistic 
gestational surrogacy in the United Kingdom and South Africa. 
148 Section 295 (c), Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005 of the Republic of South Africa), see also 
Section 54, Human Fertilization and Embryology Act. 
149 Carbone J, ‘The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy 
Contracts,’ 597-598. 




of valid agreements so that parties are fully aware of the nature of the 
transaction and its ramifications.151 This is precisely why the arrangement 
must be entered into consensually and why it anticipates the tussles that may 
exist in future, therefore to contemplate legal parentage before the 
arrangement is concluded is in fact a wise decision.152  
In the same vein, it would then be unjust to conclude that the genetic father of 
the child shares no interest with the child or that the maternal bond overrides 
all other parental interests.153 Just like the issue of commercialization, there is 
also a requirement that the surrogate should have undergone one viable 
pregnancy before she enters into an altruistic gestational surrogacy 
arrangement to ensure she is fully prepared for the choice made.154 
iv) Concern of the Third Party 
The traditional rule is that a contract only applies to the parties to the contract 
who incur rights and obligations under the contract, referred to as the doctrine 
of privity.155 However, there are exceptions to this rule following the rationale 
that a contract can indeed affect a third party and there are instances where 
the parties intentions include the interests of the third party thus it would be 
unjust to bar the said party as was held in Darlington Borough Council v 
Wiltshire Northern Ltd156 where the following was posited: 
“The law of contract should give effect to the reasonable expectations of 
contracting parties. Principle certainly requires that a burden should not be 
                                                        
151 Posner R, ‘The Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate 
Motherhood,’25. 
152 Carbone J, ‘The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy 
Contracts,’ 598. 
153 Carbone J, ‘The Role of Contract Principles in Determining the Validity of Surrogacy 
Contracts,’ 595 where an argument is made that, “the reinforcement of the maternal bond 
hurts both women and children to the extent that it convinces women who are not fully 
prepared or able to care for their children to keep them simply because it is too painful to give 
them up. In more traditional times, the importance of maternal bonding did not prevent strong 
social support for unwed mothers who chose to place their children for adoption. 
Reinforcement of parental bonding does not necessarily override all other interests.” 
154 Section 11, Reproductive Health Care Bill. 
155 This means that any other party who is not party to the contract such as third parties cannot 
sue or be sued to enforce the contract. The doctrine was well established in the case of 
Tweddle v Atkinson [1861] EWHC QB J57, where a contract was entered into between a 
father and a future father in law to give a certain amount of money to the claimant. The latter 
sought to enforce the contract but the court held that he could not because he was not party 
to it even if he would benefit from it.  
156 Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd CA 28 JUN 1994.   
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imposed on a third party without his consent. But there is no doctrinal, logical, 
or policy reason why the law should deny effectiveness to a contract for the 
benefit of a third party where that is the expressed intention of the parties.”157 
As mentioned earlier, an altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangement is 
entered into for purpose of bringing to life a baby. The parties to the 
arrangement would not enter into such an arrangement had they not the 
intention to raise, care and protect the best interest of the child. 
3.4 Conclusion  
Having assessed the societal issues that may be raised with the enforcement 
of altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements, it is evident that contractual 
principles are sufficient to validate these arrangements. Moreover, 
considering that legal parentage is a serious issue, it would be prudent that 
parties contemplate this when contracting to avoid unnecessary problems in 
future. Likewise, the state plays an instrumental role in ensuring that there is 
an effective framework in place to enforce the terms of these arrangements 
provided they are entered into legally.  
  
                                                        
157 Darlington Borough Council v Wiltshier Northern Ltd. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF THE 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE UK AND SA 
4.0 Introduction  
This Chapter gives a comprehensive case study of the legal regulatory 
framework for altruistic gestational surrogacy in Kenya and a comparison of 
the legal frameworks in the United Kingdom (UK) and South Africa (SA).  
4.1 Legal Framework for Altruistic Gestational Surrogacy 
Arrangements in Kenya  
To begin with, under the current state, Kenya does not have in place any law 
regulating altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements, an issue the courts 
have been left to contend with by applying adoption laws to issues of legal 
parentage arising from altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements.158  
However, Kenya has in place the Reproductive Health Care Bill which affords 
a chapter for the regulation of gestational surrogacy arrangements in 
Kenya.159 
4.1.1 Review of the Reproductive Health Care Bill (the Bill) 
Primarily, the Bill provides that each and every person has a right to 
gestational surrogacy.160 This provision indicates not only Kenya’s 
willingness to adopt surrogate motherhood but also it is reflective of the basic 
right to family enshrined in Article 45 (2) of the Constitution161 and posited 
in Chapter one as a fundamental reason why childless couples opt for 
surrogate motherhood and other forms of alternative procreation.  
Secondly, the Bill posits that all forms of commercial surrogacy are prohibited 
in Kenya except where payments are made in respect of expenses incurred for 
sustenance of the pregnancy.162 This indicates why this paper focuses on 
altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements in Kenya since these are non-
commercial agreements.  
                                                        
158 Re the Matter of Baby TDL, see also J L N & 2 others v Director of Children Services & 
4 others. 
159 Part III, Reproductive Health Care Bill. 
160 Section 7(1), Reproductive Health Care Bill. 
161 Article 45(2), Constitution of Kenya.  
162 Section 14, Reproductive Health Care Bill. 
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Thirdly, the Bill is specific in outlining key requirements that must be met 
before a valid altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangement is concluded.163 
These requirements are in essence the safeguards that address the concerns 
raised in Chapter three over the enforcement of altruistic gestational surrogacy 
contacts. They ensure that the parties are protected and that altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangements are enforced legally, taking into 
consideration the state’s and the society’s concern. The requirements to enter 
into an altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangement in Kenya include: 
i) only commissioning parent or parents that are not able to give birth to 
a child and under a condition that is permanent and irreversible; 
ii) the commissioning parent, or parents are competent to enter into the 
agreement and are suitable persons to take on the parental responsibility of 
the child; 
iii) the parties understand and accept the legal consequences of the 
agreement; 
iv) the surrogate mother understands and accepts the legal consequences 
of the agreement; 
v) the surrogacy agreement is not being used as a source of income; 
vi) the surrogate mother must have had one viable pregnancy and delivery 
and a living child of her own. 
4.2.2 Legal Parentage Gap in the Reproductive Health Care Bill 
While the Bill indicates a positive stride in coming up with a legal framework 
for altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements, the Bill does not address the 
element of legal parentage in these arrangements.  
First and foremost, the Bill defines gestational surrogacy as the process where 
a woman carries to term a child whose being is effected using the gamete or 
gametes of at least one of the intended parents and to which the gestational 
surrogate has made no genetic contribution.164 This provision may 
immediately probe one to assume that the Bill impliedly links the baby to the 
intended parents and not the surrogate since the latter makes no genetic 
                                                        
163 Section 11, Reproductive Health Care Bill. 
164 Section 2, Reproductive Health Care Bill.  
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contribution to the child.165 However, it is such an assumption that has led to 
the uncertainties and controversies evident in the legal battles in courts in 
Kenya today. For example, cases like A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General 
& 5 others, JLN & 2others v Director of Children Services & 4 others and  Re 
the Matter of Baby TDL are instances where the surrogate had no genetic link 
to the child but there still existed a legal tussle as to who the child’s legal 
mother was.166 Additionally, the Births and Deaths Registration Act defines 
birth as, “the issuing forth of any child from its mother after the expiration of 
the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, whether or not it is dead.”167 Evidently, 
the act recognises that a child’s legal mother is the one who gave birth to the 
child. 
In the absence of clear direction in the law or the proposed law, the birth 
mother who is the surrogate may claim to have parental rights premised on 
the fact that she carried the baby to full term and gave birth to it but on the 
other hand, the commissioning parents equally too have a right to claim legal 
parental rights over the child. Therefore, it is imperative that the law in Kenya 
is clearer on this issue to avoid future conflicts. Other jurisdictions have been 
effective in providing for this, thus, the next sections of this Chapter offer a 
comparison with the regulatory framework in the United Kingdom and that of 
South Africa.   
4.2 Regulation of Altruistic Gestational Surrogate Motherhood in the UK 
4.2.1 Introduction and Brief Background  
Primarily, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland commonly 
known as Britain has had a long standing history with the concept of surrogacy 
with a comprehensive framework for the regulation of altruistic gestational 
                                                        
165 Section 10, Reproductive Health Care Bill which provides that a surrogacy arrangement 
is only valid if the conception of the child is effected using the gametes of both 
commissioning parents and if this is not possible using the gametes of at least one of the 
commissioning parents. 
166 A.M.N & 2 others v Attorney General & 5 others JLN & 2others v Director of Children 
Services & 4 others, Re the Matter of Baby TDL. 
167 Section 2, Births and Deaths Registration Act, Cap 149 (No 2. of 1928), see also 
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1424.html on 10 October 2016 where it is posited that a surrogate 




surrogacy arrangements. This is why this paper considered it prudent to look 
into its legal framework.168  
i) Warnock Report of 1984169 
To begin with, even before Britain had a legal framework on surrogacy 
arrangements, in 1982, the British parliament established the Committee of 
Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology to examine these recent 
developments.170 In 1984, the committee released a report known as the 
‘Warnock Report.’171 The report recommended that all surrogacy contracts be 
made illegal by statute and therefore unenforceable in the courts.172 The report 
also recommended that where an egg is donated by one woman to another, the 
woman who gives birth to the child is entitled to the legal rights pertaining to 
the child with no entitlements to the egg donor.173 Evidently, the Warnock 
report took a moralist approach towards surrogacy. Its recommendations were 
based on the premise that surrogacy encourages the use of human beings as 
means to an end which in turn leads to exploitation. 174 
ii) Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985175 
Despite the fact that the Warnock report proposed the unenforceability of 
surrogacy arrangements, in 1985, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act (SAA) was 
enacted. This was due to as a series of controversial cases concerning surrogacy 
                                                        
168 Garrity A, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Surrogacy Law in the United States and Great 
Britain - A Proposed Model Statute for Louisiana,’ 816. 
169 Government of the United Kingdom, Department of Health and Social Security, Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 1984. 
170 http://www.hfea.gov.uk/2068.html established in 1982 inquire into the new technologies 
and techniques that afforded ways of reproduction, for instance vitro fertilisation (IVF) and 
embryology. This was prompted by the birth of Louise Brown in 1978 who was the first baby 
born of the IVF Technique. While the committee mainly focussed on IVF Technologies it 
also explored the issue of surrogacy arrangements as well.   
171 Government of the United Kingdom, Department of Health and Social Security, Report of 
the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 1984.  
172 Section 59, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology. 
173 Section 55, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology. 
174 Dr McLachlan H and Professor Swales K, ‘Surrogate Motherhood: Beyond the Warnock 
and the Brazier Reports,’ 11 Human Reproduction and Genetic Ethics (2005), 2 where the 
Warnock report is criticised in the sense that there are different ways in which human beings 
are used as ends and these ways are not necessarily exploitative but even beneficial. For 
example, contractual arrangements always stipulate obligations on either party. These 
obligations aim at the satisfaction of the other party’s’ needs, and in so doing using the other 
party as a means. It all depends on how one is used for a conclusion of exploitation to arise. 
175 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. 
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arrangements.176 The first surrogacy case in 1985, popularly known as the Baby 
Cotton Case177 where the court observed since there was no available legal 
regulation of surrogacy arrangements at the time, it ruled in favour of the 
commissioning parents based on what was in the best interest for the child.178 The 
case led to a lot of publicity with issues on the commercialization of the whole 
process coming into question.179 Consequently, Britain was in need of a legal 
framework to give direction to these agreements and thus the SAA was enacted. 
However, the latter did not provide for the determination of legal parentage in 
surrogacy arrangements.  
iii) The Brazier Report of 1998180 
In 1997, the UK requested a committee181 to look into surrogacy 
arrangements. The committee came up with a report in 1998.182 Unlike the 
rigid approach taken by the Warnock Committee, the Brazier report sought to 
take into account the interests of the surrogate and the commissioning 
couple.183 Thus, it recommended regulation and control of surrogacy contracts 
rather than a complete ban.184  Furthermore, the report also recommended that 
                                                        
176Gamble N, ‘Children of our time,’ Family Law Journal (2008), 12, see also  Re an Adoption 
Application (Surrogacy), Decision of the United Kingdom High Court 11 March 1987 where 
a surrogate was paid £ 10,000 ($17,860)  to gestate and bear a child for an intending couple. 
The court in its interpretation of the issue observed that the contract was executed before the 
enactment of the Surrogacy Arrangement Act that banned commercial surrogacy and thus 
could not rule on it. Therefore, the court held that the payments were merely to compensate 
the surrogate for any expenses incurred to support the pregnancy. 
177 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] FLR 846. 
178 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy), where the judge determined that his obligation 
was to decipher what was best for the child. Consequently, the judge held that the baby was 
better suited with the commissioning parents and not Miss Kim Cotton, the surrogate, who 
had been paid 6,500 pounds by the commissioning parents.  
179 Trimmings K and Beaumont P, ‘International surrogacy arrangements: an urgent need for 
legal regulation at the international level’ 7.3 Journal of Private International Law (2011), 
628. See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/193076.stm on 10 October 2016. 
180 United Kingdom Health Ministries, Review for health ministers of current arrangements 
for payments and regulation: Report of the review team, 1998. 
181 The three key members of the review committee include: Margaret Brazier, Alastair 
Campbell, and Susan Golombok. The report they came up with is consequently and popularly 
referred to as the Brazier Report.  
182 United Kingdom Health Ministries, Review for health ministers of current arrangements 
for payments and regulation: Report of the review team. 
183 United Kingdom Health Ministries, Review for health ministers of current arrangements 
for payments and regulation: Report of the review team, 2 where the committee posits that 
the aim of regulation of surrogacy arrangements should be to protect all parties under the 
contract. Similarly, a recommendation was also made for the enactment of a code of practice 
for the institution of surrogacy which would, “seek to ensure that the interests of surrogates 
and commissioning couples are adequately protected and that all parties to an arrangement 
are clear about their expectations of each other.” 
184 United Kingdom Health Ministries, Review for health ministers of current arrangements 
for payments and regulation: Report of the review team, 10, see also Dr McLachlan H and 
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parental orders185 should be granted by the High court to give the intending 
parents legal rights over the child born from the surrogate. On the issue of 
payments made, it recommended a strict method of making lawful payments 
to the surrogate to ensure that commercialization and exploitation of the entire 
process is curbed.186  
iv) Determination of Legal Parentage of the Child 
As mentioned above, the SAA did not provide for the determination of legal 
parentage in surrogacy arrangements.187 It is therefore complimented by 
various other acts that provided for the element of legal parentage in an 
altruistic gestational surrogacy contract.  
a. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFEA) 2008188 
Similar to the HFEA of 1990, the 2008 Act provides that the legal mother in 
an altruistic gestational surrogacy contract is the woman who carries or who 
has carried a child as a result of the placing in her of an embryo or of sperm 
and eggs.189 Likewise, where the surrogate mother is married, her husband 
will be treated as the legal father provided there is no evidence indicating his 
lack of consent on this.190 
The Act also stipulates that the commissioning couple can only be granted 
parental rights to the child through a parental order. 191 While the Act 
exhaustively goes into the requirements that must be met before a parental 
order is granted,192 the courts in determining whether these orders should be 
granted not only take into account the requirements but also the circumstances 
                                                        
Professor Swales K, ‘Surrogate Motherhood: Beyond the Warnock and the Brazier 
Reports,’6.  
185 A Parental Order is an order made by the courts with the effect of making the intending 
couple the legal parents of the child born out of the surrogacy arrangement.  
186 Section 7.11, Review for health ministers of current arrangements for payments and 
regulation: Report of the review team, where a recommendation was made that the only legal 
payments that can be made are those made in light of the expenses made in furtherance of the 
pregnancy. This is a recommendation that the British government has adopted in its laws. 
Similarly, the committee also recommended that the definition of expenses be added into the 
relevant legal instruments to avoid any ambiguities and ensure certainty on the issue. 
187 The Act however prohibits all forms of commercial surrogacy contracts and it also makes 
it illegal to have advertisements for surrogacy. 
188 Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 13 November 2008. 
189 Section 33, Human Fertilization and Embryology Act. 
190 Section 35, Human Fertilization and Embryology Act. 
191 Section 54(1), Human Fertilization and Embryology Act. 
192 Section 54, Human Fertilization and Embryology Act. 
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of each case consequently adopting a purposive approach. For instance in Re 
X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit),193 Sir James Munby P observed that,  
“parental orders go to the most fundamental aspects of status and to the very 
identity of the child and have a transformative effect on the child's legal 
relationships with the surrogate and commissioning parents and the practical 
and psychological realities of the child's identity, thus having an effect 
extending far beyond the merely legal, which is, for all practical purposes, 
irreversible.”194  
Having considered this, the requirements for granting a parental order include: 
1) Applicants must be married or civil partners of each other.195 
However, this requirement is qualified by the courts consideration of the best 
interest of the child.  For instance in G v G196 an application was made to set 
aside a parental order on the grounds that the intending mother sought to leave 
her husband once the order was granted. The court still observed that the in 
the best interest of the child, the order would still be given.   
2) Applicants must be eighteen (18) years of age at the time of making 
the order. 
3) Application for the order should be made within 6months of the birth 
of the child. However, there are instances where the limit has been extended 
by the court. For example, in Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit)197, the 
                                                        
193 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) [2014] EWHC 3135 (Fam). 
194Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) where Sir James quoted the dicta of  
Sir Stanley Burnton in Newbold and others v Coal Authority [2013] EWCA where Burnton 
posited that, “in all cases, one must first construe the statutory requirement in question. It may 
require strict compliance with a requirement as a condition of its validity. Against that, on its 
true construction a statutory requirement may be satisfied by what is referred to as adequate 
compliance. Finally, it may be that even non-compliance with a requirement is not fatal. In 
all such cases, it is necessary to consider the words of the statute in the light of its subject 
matter, the background, the purpose of the requirement, if that is known or determined, and 
the actual or possible effect of non-compliance on the parties. We assume that Parliament in 
the case of legislation would have intended a sensible result.” 
195 This means that the United Kingdom’s system of surrogacy recognizes persons of the same 
sex as civil partners entitled to commission for parental orders, see also Civil Partnership Act, 
Cap 33, 2004 which is a UK Legislation that recognizes civil partners as having rights similar 
to that of traditional married couples. Consequently, civil partners can enter into surrogate 
arrangements and apply for parental orders as well.   
196 G v G [2012] EWHC. 
197 Re X (A Child) (Surrogacy: Time Limit) where a surrogacy arrangement was entered into 
by commissioning parents and surrogate parents in India valid under Indian Law. The 
surrogate mother conceived using eggs donated by a third party and the commissioning 
father's donor sperm. The surrogate parents consented to relinquishing all their parental rights 
to the child born. The commissioning parents however got divorced before the parental order 
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court in its consideration of the best interest of the child allowed for a time 
limit extension of twenty (20) months. Similarly, in AB v CD (Surrogacy: time 
limit and consent)198 the time limit was extended by three (3) years while in 
A & B (Children) (Surrogacy: Parental orders: time limits),199 the time limit 
was extended by over 7 years. 
4) At the time of application, the child should be living with the intending 
couple of whom either or both must be domiciled in the United Kingdom, 
Channel Islands or the Isle of Man. 
5) Surrogate mother and father have consented and fully understand the 
implications of the order. Additionally, if the consent of the surrogate mother 
is given less than six weeks after the child’s birth, it is considered ineffective. 
However, the court may dispense with such agreement in circumstances 
where the surrogate (and husband, if applicable) cannot be found or are 
incapable of giving agreement as was observed in D and L (Surrogacy).200  
6) No payments should be made to the surrogate in respect of the 
arrangement other than expenses made for the sustenance of the pregnancy.  
                                                        
was granted. Additionally, the application for the parental order was made two years after the 
birth of the child, not adhering to the six month limit. In light of the fact that the child had a 
biological relationship with the commissioning father and other circumstances of the case, 
the court adopted a purposive approach to the requirements stipulated by section 54 and held 
that the court was “concerned not only with the impact on the applicants of its decision but 
the welfare of the child, and because of this, a more liberal and relaxed approach than that 
taken in relation to time limits would be best.”  
198 AB v CD (Surrogacy: time limit and consent) [2015] EWFC 12 this case involved a 
surrogacy arrangement where parental orders were made in respect of twins but the surrogate 
mother had no notice of this and the application was made over 3 years after the birth of the 
children. The court, while adopting a purposive interpretation to the relevant provisions where 
parental orders are concerned held that, “parental orders and the consequences that flow from 
it are, from a welfare perspective, far more suited to surrogacy situations. They were 
specifically created to deal with these situations. Put simply, they are a more honest order 
which reflects the reality of what was intended, the lineage connection that already exists and 
more accurately reflects the child's identity.” Subsequently, the court held that the 
commissioning parents were entitled to the order regardless of the failure to strictly adhere to 
the requirements and the time limit.  
199 A & B (Children) (Surrogacy: Parental orders: time limits) [2015] EWHC 911. 
200 D and L (Surrogacy) [2012] EWHC 2631 (Fam) this case involved civil partners (male 
couple) who sought a parental order over twins born out of a surrogacy arrangement. The 
couple had complied with all the requirements of making the application for the parental order 
except for getting the consent of the surrogate mother who could not be found. Sir Baker J in 
his consideration of the issue observed that where all reasonable steps have been taken to 
locate or contact the surrogate mother but to no avail, the court is allowed to dispense with 
the need of her consent. Furthermore, the main concern of the court is the welfare of the 
children and as such the learned judge considered the granting of a parental order in order. It 
is also worth noting that the court also considered that the surrogate had on numerous 
occasions before the birth of the baby signified consent to relinquish parental rights. However, 
the weight given to earlier consent is minimal. 
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b. Family Procedure Rules 2010201 
Parental orders are also provided for under the family procedure rules where 
the applicants could either be a married couple, civil partners or two persons 
living as partners in an enduring family relationship and are not within the 
prohibited degrees of relationship.202 The rules also provide that the consent 
of the surrogate may not be required in making of the parental order where 
she cannot be found or is incapable of giving agreement.203 
4.3 Regulation of Gestational Surrogate Motherhood in South Africa  
South Africa provides an exemplary illustration of the African approach 
towards surrogate motherhood. Since Kenya is also an African country, a 
comparison with another country whose cultural background and practices 
may be closer to that of Kenya is in order. Essentially, what matters in SA is 
that the surrogate is of mature age, has a child or children of her own and there 
is a valid contract between the surrogate and the commissioning parents 
involved.204  
4.3.1 Brief Background 
One of the earliest surrogacy arrangements recognised publicly in SA was that 
of Karen Ferreira-Jorge of Tzaneen in 1987.205 The latter’s mother, Pat 
Anthony carried triplets for her, because she was unable to carry children of 
her own. This case was more so unique because Karen Jorge was one of the 
first women to bear her own grandchildren.206  
                                                        
201 Part 13, Family Procedure Rules 2010. 
202 Section 13.3, Family Procedure Rules. 
203 Section 13.10, Family Procedure Rules. 
204 Mahlobogwane F, ‘Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements in South Africa: Changing 
Societal Norms?’ 2 Speculum Juris (2013), 2. 
205http://www.nytimes.com/1987/04/09/world/woman-is-carrying-her-daughters-
babies.html on 12 October 2016. 
206http://www.nytimes.com/1987/10/02/world/south-africa-woman-gives-birth-to-3-
grandchildren-and-history.html on 12 October 2016, Mrs. Pat Anthony is considered the first 
woman to successfully carry her daughter's transplanted embryos to term. Mrs. Anthony was 
implanted with the ova of her daughter that had been inseminated artificially with her son-in-
law's sperm and successfully delivered triplets, two boys and a girl by Caesarean. At the time 
of this arrangement, South Africa had not developed law regulating surrogacy arrangements 
therefore Mrs. Anthony was the legal guardian of the three children. However, this 
arrangement posed fresh moral and legal questions in the debate surrounding surrogacy 
impacting on the current legislation in South Africa today on surrogacy. 
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The publicity that came with the Pat Anthony case and the fact that at the time 
South Africa did not have a legal regulatory framework on surrogacy 
arrangements prompted the need for an in depth review of surrogacy 
arrangements in South Africa.207  
Consequently, in 1989, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALC) 
conducted a questionnaire in the issue which informed a report on surrogate 
motherhood in 1993, the report was tabled before the Ad Hoc Parliamentary 
Committee (AHPC). The committee conducted an extensive examination and 
review of these reports208 and came up with its own report in 1999 as well as 
a draft legislation developed by the SALC. Both of these acknowledged the 
need for a law regulating surrogacy agreements.209 At the same time, the Child 
Care Act210 was under review by the SALC where it was found that surrogacy 
agreements had not been sufficiently regulated in the Children's Status Act. 
In 2002, another report was released which recommended that the regulation 
of surrogacy arrangements be provided for under the Children’s Bill (now 
Act).211 In June 2005, the Children’s Bill was approved by the National 
Assembly and consequently the Children’s Act came into force with a chapter 
on the regulation of gestational surrogacy arrangements. 212 
4.3.2 The Children’s Act213 
Surrogacy arrangements in South Africa are primarily governed by the 
Children’s Act.214 According to the Act, surrogate motherhood is defined as, 
                                                        
207 Lewis S, ‘Surrogacy in South Africa,’ University of Western Cape Faculty of Law (2011) 
2, the laws in force at the time, the 1986 Regulations on Artificial Insemination of Persons 
and Related Matters (the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983) and the Children’s Status Act (No. 
82 of 1987) did provide for surrogacy arrangements.  
208 The AHPC not only reviewed the reports but it also hosted informative comprehensive 
workshops with experts on surrogacy and conducted public hearings. It also conducted study 
tours in different regions of South Africa to research on perceptions of surrogacy in these 
regions. Similarly, these regions were chosen because they were found to be the regions that 
fostered surrogacy. The committee also reviewed the surrogacy frameworks in other 
jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and the United States. 
209 Lewis S, ‘Surrogacy in South Africa,’ 3. 
210 The Child Care Act (No. 74 of 1983). 
211 Sloth-Nielsen J, ‘Surrogacy, South African style’ Family Law Newsletter (2013), 19, 
following the recommendation to regulate surrogacy arrangements, the Children’s Bill 
afforded a Chapter (20) to openly regulate surrogate motherhood and establish surrogacy as 
a legally recognised procedure of assisted reproduction. 
212 Chapter 19, Children’s Act (No. 38 of 2005). 
213 Children’s Act. 




“an agreement between a surrogate mother and a commissioning parent in 
which it is agreed that the surrogate mother will be artificially fertilised for 
the purpose of bearing a child for the commissioning parent and in which the 
surrogate mother undertakes to hand over such a child to the commissioning 
parent upon its birth, or within a reasonable time thereafter, with the intention 
that the child concerned becomes the legitimate child of the commissioning 
parent.”215 
Secondly, the Act stipulates certain requirements that must be met for a 
surrogacy arrangement to be valid in South Africa.216 These requirements 
include: 
i) The agreement must be in writing and signed by all the parties. 
ii) The agreement is entered into in South Africa. 
iii) At least one (1) of the commissioning parents is domiciled in the 
Republic. 
iv) Consent of husband, wife or partner of a commissioning parent or 
surrogate.217 
v) Genetic origin of the child should be confirmed in the agreement as 
that of either the use of the gametes of both commissioning parents or the 
gamete of at least one (1) of the commissioning parents.218 
vi) Both parties must fully understand, be competent to enter the 
agreement and consent to the implications of the agreement.219  
vii) The surrogate mother must also:220 
a) understand and accept the legal consequences of the agreement, 
b) not use the surrogacy arrangement as a source of income, therefore the 
surrogate must have entered the agreement for altruistic reasons and not for 
commercial reasons, 
                                                        
215 Section 1, Children’s Act. 
216 Section 292, Children’s Act. 
217 Section 293, Children’s Act, this section is however qualified under subsection 3 where if 
the husband or partner of a surrogate mother who is not the genetic parent of the child 
unreasonably withholds his or her consent, the court may confirm the agreement. 
218 Section 294, Children’s Act. 
219 Section 295, Children’s Act, full understanding includes the acceptance by the 
commissioning parents of all rights and obligations that accrue to parenthood. The court 
therefore takes into consideration that these are suitable persons to bear these obligations.  
220 Section 295 (c), Children’s Act.  
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c) have a documented history of at least one pregnancy and viable 
delivery, 
d) Has a living child of her own. 
4.3.3 Legal Parentage of the Child  
Most importantly, the Act provides that the effect of the surrogate 
arrangement is that it affords the commissioning parents legal parental rights 
over the child born out of the arrangement immediately the child is born. 
Furthermore, the Act clearly stipulates that neither the surrogate not her 
husband or partner has any legal rights over the child and is obliged to hand 
over the child as soon as reasonably possible after the birth of the child.221 
This is quite different from the United Kingdom’s framework where the 
commissioning parents must first obtain a parental order to make the legal 
parents of the child. 
Exception to the Legal Parentage Rule 
There are two exceptions provided for under the Act where the 
commissioning parents may not be the legal parents of the child born out of 
the surrogacy arrangement.  
First and foremost, where a surrogate motherhood agreement does not comply 
with the requirements stipulated under the Children’s Act and is considered 
invalid; a child born out of an invalid surrogacy agreement will be deemed to 
be the child of the woman that gave birth to that child. 222  
Secondly, if the surrogacy arrangement is terminated by the surrogate mother 
within sixty (60) days after the birth of the child by filing a written notice with 
the court which takes into consideration several factors including the best 
interest of the child before making an appropriate order.223 Should the court 
make an order to terminate the arrangement, the effect of this would be that 
the surrogate mother retains all parental rights to the child.224 
                                                        
221 Section 297, Children’s Act.  
222 Section 297 (2), Children’s Act.  
223 Section 298, Children’s Act.  
224 Section 299, Children’s Act.  
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4.4 Application of the comparative review to Altruistic Gestational 
Surrogacy Arrangements  in Kenya  
This chapter has undertaken an extensive twofold analysis of the regulatory 
frameworks on legal parentage in the United Kingdom and South Africa. The 
former requires that a parental order is granted to make the commissioning 
couple the legal parents of the child while the latter clearly states that all 
parental rights immediately go to the commissioning couple upon birth of the 
child. In both jurisdictions, the issue of legal parentage has been 
predetermined in the law regulating surrogacy arrangements.  
Similarly, in both jurisdictions, altruistic gestational surrogacy agreements are 
recognised and enforced as binding agreements under the law. In the UK, an 
altruistic gestational surrogacy agreement is enforced through a parental order 
which is required to give the intending couple legal parental rights over the 
child, but in South Africa, the law recognises that the intending couple has 
parental rights upon the the immediate birth of the child,  noting that if the 
agreement has been freely and consensually entered into by both parties, it is 
binding on the parties. It is also important at this juncture to highlight that a 
surrogate under an altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangement has no genetic 
link to the baby, the latter is formed through the consummation of the gametes 
of the intending couple or at least one gamete of one partner in the couple. 
Therefore, from a human rights perspective, the intending couple, as posited 
by Edgar Page simply transfer these rights to the surrogate to gestate the baby 
on agreement that they will be transferred back once the baby is born.225  
The requirements to validate altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements in 
both jurisdictions mirror those that validate a contract, but, in both 
jurisdictions, commercial surrogacy is prohibited, therefore, there is no formal 
consideration in an altruistic arrangement but under promissory estoppel there 
is a reliance that both parties will perform their obligations. In addition to this, 
the laws in both jurisdictions provide for the right of each person to gestational 
surrogacy and the right of persons to a family which is the primary basis on 
which altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements are enforced.  
                                                        
225 Page E, ‘Donation, Surrogacy and Adoption’ 163-164. 




Kenya should provide for the determination of legal parentage under the 
proposed regulatory framework for altruistic gestational surrogacy 
agreements. The United Kingdom and South Africa offer different approaches 
that may be adopted to address the issue of legal parentage of the child. Based 
on this, one can arrive at a recommended model for Kenya which will be 
discussed further in the next Chapter.  
48 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The objective of this chapter is to give a discussion on the findings of this 
research and offer recommendations for the proposed legal framework 
regulating altruistic gestational surrogacy contacts in Kenya.  
5.1 Discussion 
5.1.1 Analysis of the current framework for altruistic gestational 
surrogacy arrangements 
To begin with, this research paper has explored the concept of legal parentage 
in altruistic gestational surrogacy contracts and the application of these 
contracts in the society. The proposed Reproductive Health Care Bill which 
affords a chapter for the regulation of altruistic gestational surrogacy in Kenya 
indicates Kenya’s intention to have these arrangements legally enforceable.226 
However, the bill fails to address the issue of legal parentage in the event that 
a tussle exists between the parties to the contract. As a result, Kenyan courts 
have been left to deal with this issue with no existing direction in the law.227 
Justice Majanja posited in JLN & 2others v Director of Children Services & 
4 others,228 that surrogacy is not a hypothetical issue and the onus is on the 
state to protect children born from surrogacy arrangements by providing an 
effective legal framework. Clearly, this is an issue that should be addressed to 
                                                        
226 Chapter 3, Reproductive Health Bill.  
227J L N & 2 others v Director of Children Services & 4 others where Justice Majanja posited 
that a surrogacy arrangement is no longer a hypothetical issue but a real issue that should be 
addressed in the law.   
228 J L N & 2 others v Director of Children Services & 4 others [2014] eKLR, even in the 
absence of a legal regime, the court or any persons dealing with the issues must, in accordance 
with Article 57 of the Constitution, decide the issue on the basis of the best interests of the 
child. A child born out of a surrogacy arrangement is no different from any other child. Under 
Article 53 of the Constitution and section 11 of the Children Act every child has the right to 
certainty of their parentage, a right to family, a right to a name acquired through issuance of 
a birth certificate, a right to access health services and a right not to suffer discrimination of 
any form arising from their surrogate birth. These rights are buttressed by international 
instruments like the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African 





avoid future conflicts and ensure protection to parties that enter into altruistic 
gestational surrogacy arrangements.  
Chapter two gives a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical framework of 
the law of contract. It provides an important basis since altruistic gestational 
surrogacy arrangements are essentially contracts between two parties. The 
chapter indicates that the law of contract is self-regulatory in itself through 
the requirements that validate a contract and the vitiating elements that would 
render a contract void.229  
A contract is concluded once there is offer and acceptance from the parties 
who must have the capacity to contact and an intention to be legally bound by 
the agreement. A contract entered into under duress or coercion or mistake is 
legally invalid and thus unenforceable. This similarly applies to an altruistic 
gestational surrogacy contract, if it is entered into under vitiating 
circumstances or substantially illegal, it is unenforceable and the parties are 
not bound by the obligations arising from such a contract. This ensures that 
an altruistic gestational surrogacy contract is entered into consensually, freely 
and voluntarily by both parties, therefore the latter can be reasonably 
presumed to intend to be bound by the terms of the agreement.   
In the same vein, the consent theory of contract agrees with this line of 
thinking as it posits that a contract entered into freely and unequivocally by 
both parties creates legally binding obligations on the parties. 230 For this 
reason, provided an altruistic gestational surrogacy contract adheres to the 
tenets of a valid contract and there are no vitiating elements, the surrogacy 
arrangement is legally enforceable.   
5.1.2 Analysis of the state’s/societal interest in an altruistic gestational 
surrogacy arrangement 
Even so, while the law of contract is largely characterized by party 
autonomy,231 it still appreciates that the state has an important role to play in 
                                                        
229 Onyekachi D, ‘Vitiating elements of a contract as a source of contract validity’, 2-3. 
230 Barnett R, ‘A Consent Theory of Contract,’ 301. 
231 Edwards C, ‘Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The 
Tug of War Continues’ Faculty Publications (2009), 647 where the party autonomy in the 
law of contract is based on the Classical contract theory that emerged in the late nineteenth 
century. “The theory insists that the unrestricted exercise of freedom of contract between 
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the enforcement of contracts.  Furthermore, an altruistic gestational surrogacy 
contract is not just any other contract but a unique arrangement which 
involves bringing into life a third party whose welfare is affected by the terms 
and enforcement of the arrangement. Chapter three provides an analysis for 
this as it explores the state’s and the society’s concern in altruistic gestational 
surrogacy contracts.  
Truly, contracts cannot be fully left to the whims of individuals since even 
under the traditional view of the theory of contract which was based on equal 
parties and an equal bargaining power, it is not always so that the parties are 
equal leading to oppressive bargains.232 Likewise, the state also plays a 
significant role in ensuring that the contract is legally enforced and that the 
parties to the contract are protected.  In the same vein, in Holden v Hardy,233 
the court observed that the state does have an interest in the law of contract 
and under the state police power,234 a state would be justified to interfere with 
a contract. This is exactly what Chapter three of this paper contemplates, that 
an altruistic gestational surrogacy contract cannot be left solely to the will of 
the parties in the agreement.  
The question then is to what extent the state or the society should be involved 
in the enforcement of these contracts. Chapter three indicates the interests that 
the society and the state may have where altruistic gestational surrogacy 
contracts are concerned. Issues of morality are raised while the state’s primary 
concern is if the contract is in line with public policy. The application of 
contractual principles to these concerns as depicted in the Chapter clearly 
shows how the law of contract is sufficient enough to safeguard these 
concerns. It also appreciates that the state’s concern which is primarily the 
care and protection of the child born out of the arrangement, is in line with the 
parties concern since parties would not contract in the first place had they not 
had the best interests of the child.235 In addition to this, an altruistic gestational 
                                                        
parties who possess equal bargaining power, equal skill, and perfect knowledge of relevant 
market conditions maximizes individual welfare and promotes the most efficient allocation 
of resources in the marketplace”; see also Smith S, Contract Theory, 46-47. 
232 Edwards C, ‘Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The 
Tug of War Continues’, 648. 
233 Holden v. Hardy 169 U.S. 366 [1898]. 
234 State police power includes matters of public health, safety, security or even morals.  




surrogacy contract can be deemed unenforceable if either of the parties 
contract under duress, coercion, lack of free will or even mistake. Therefore, 
the parties are only bound to these contacts if they are entered into 
consensually and unequivocally.  
5.1.3 Analysis of the comparative review to the determination of legal 
parentage of altruistic gestational surrogacy arrangements in Kenya 
Subsequently, Chapter four gives a comparison of how other jurisdictions 
have dealt with the question of legal parentage showing the state’s inevitable 
role in the enforcement of an altruistic gestational surrogacy contract. In both 
the United Kingdom and South Africa, a step has been taken in ensuring that 
the question of legal parentage is determined by law.  
To begin with, the United Kingdom shows a history where the moral and 
ethical issues raised in Chapter three were also considered in reports like the 
Warnock and Brazier report. However, the regulatory framework depicts how 
the United Kingdom was able to construct its legal regulatory framework to 
ensure that these concerns are safeguarded but altruistic gestational surrogacy 
contracts are still enforceable. Similar to the situation in South Africa where 
certain requirements must be met before parties are allowed to enter into a 
gestational surrogacy contract. For instance, the surrogate mother must have 
had one viable pregnancy or that the agreement must be non-commercial. It 
is these safeguards that ensure that the concerns that may be raised by society 
and the state in Chapter three are dealt with accordingly.  
Furthermore, the law in the United Kingdom is that the surrogate mother is 
the legal mother until such a time a parental order is issued to grant the 
commissioning couple legal parental rights to the child while the law in South 
Africa is that  the commissioning parents are the legal parents of the child 
upon the birth of the child. The United Kingdom offers an approach that gives 
the surrogate the right to be the legal parent of the child while South Africa 
recognises that the contract intended the commissioning parents as the legal 
parents of the child and thus parental rights are entitled to them from the start.  
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5.2 Recommendations  
In light of the fact that this paper adequately shows that provided an altruistic 
gestational surrogacy is entered into freely, consensually, rationally and 
unequivocally and both parties have met the requirements put in place to 
ensure that the agreement is in line with the legal regulatory framework, then 
the terms of an altruistic gestational surrogacy contract should be legally 
enforceable and binding on the parties.  
With that said, this paper recommends that the Reproductive Health Care Bill 
provides for the determination of legal parentage in an altruistic gestational 
surrogacy agreement where the legal parental rights go to the commissioning 
couple upon the birth of the child similar to the framework in South Africa. 
Further, that the law specifically posits that an altruistic gestational surrogacy 
contact can only be enforced where the parties have, in the contract, provided 
for the determination of legal parentage of the child upon birth. 
Secondly, the law should be clear and consistent on the definition of a mother 
to avoid confusion. While the implied definition in the Births and Deaths 
Registration Act is that a legal mother is the one who gives birth to the child, 
this act as well as other laws regarding the same issue should be amended to 
reflect the incorporation of altruistic gestational surrogacy contracts. In so 
doing, the law will recognise that a commissioning couple in a surrogacy 
arrangement obtain parental rights upon the birth of the baby and thus the 
female intended parent is the legal mother of the child.   
Thirdly, this paper asserts that the enforcement of the terms of an altruistic 
gestational surrogacy should not be in conflict with the state’s or the society’s 
interest. In fact, this paper posits in both Chapters three and four that the state 
plays a crucial role in not only providing for an effective framework for these 
contracts but also in ensuring that their enforcement protects the parties 
concerned and realises the goal of giving effect to the right to family enshrined 
in Article 45(2) of the Constitution.236  
                                                        
236 Article 45(2), Constitution of Kenya.  
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Summarily, it is not sufficient simply enact laws, the enforcement of altruistic 
gestational surrogacy contacts requires practical implementation. Trainings 
should be conducted in medical facilities, hospitals and learning institutions 
and there should be the creation of legal gestational surrogacy agencies where 
parties can seek assistance when entering into altruistic gestational surrogacy 
arrangements.  
5.3 Conclusion 
The incorporation into the law of legal parentage in an altruistic gestational 
surrogacy contract is an endeavour that will not only serve the parties to the 
contract but also the state and ultimately the society. This is worth pursuing 
to ensure certainty and clarity in the enforcement of these arrangements. 
Undisputedly, this is a goal in line with the realization of not only the 
fundamental right to family but also the best interest of the child born from an 
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